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This thesis examines the evolution of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) as an institution in the International System by reference to 
Articles 4, 5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty of 1949. Initially, the thesis 
considers NATO from an international relations perspective. It then proceeds to 
examine the institutional evolutionary process of the Alliance since its inception 
and implementation in 1949. Furthermore, it explores the significance and the 
meaning of the aforementioned Articles. This thesis utilizes the case study 
method and refers to four distinct events that have shaped allied policies and 
strategies: the Suez Crisis of 1956, the establishment of the politico-military 
consultation process, the Yom Kippur War (1973), and the end of the Cold War 
(1989-1991). It also examines the allied policies after the events of September 
11, 2001. Moreover, it identifies a general pattern of events pertinent to crisis 
creation inside NATO when the organization is facing a defense issue outside the 
Euro-Atlantic area.  Finally, the thesis concludes that NATO is more than an 
ordinary military Alliance, as advocated by its longevity, agility and adaptability, 
which allows the Alliance to maintain a central position in the International 
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This thesis analyzes the institutional evolution of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) by examining Articles 4, 5 and 6 of its Treaty, as well as, 
NATO’s role in the International System. Notwithstanding the importance of all 
the Articles of the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949, and their equal importance in 
their own right, Articles 4, 5, and 6 present a challenge to be examined for the 
following reasons: 
• Article 5 (collective defense) is the fundamental article of the treaty, the 
crux of the Alliance, as it provides the fundamental pledge of the 
Alliance to support collective defense for its member states. 
• Article 4 (consultation) is the basis used in the internal processes and 
deliberations of the Alliance to readjust and reorient its policies and 
strategies. It also provides the vehicle by which the Alliance evolves, 
based on established norms of cooperation among democracies, even 
when the disparity between the United States (U.S.) and the other 
members remain a tangible fact. 
• Article 6 (geographical are) is important for the contemporary evolution 
of the Alliance because it defines the geographical area within which 
the provisions of Article 5 apply. This is an issue in which the Alliance 
has been interested since its inception; however, Cold War 
preoccupations overshadowed it.  
NATO, besides being a military alliance based on mutual collective 
defense pledges among its member states, is a complex political organization 
and as such has to adapt to the changes of international politics by transforming 
its roles, policies and strategies.  
Since its inception and implementation, the Washington Treaty has been 
the major document for the Alliance. It has been supplemented by several 
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significant documents like, the report of the 1956 committee of the “three Wise 
Men”, the 1967 Harmel report, and the Strategic Concepts of 1991 and 1999. 
The ability of the Alliance to generate policies which adapts and/or transform its 
strategy represents the adaptive and agile behavior of NATO to withstand 
changes in international politics. 
 
B. MAIN QUESTIONS AND ARGUMENTS 
The main question of this thesis is how the Atlantic Alliance has evolved, 
from the perspective of Articles 4, 5 and 6, to assume the new roles in the 
strategic landscape of the International System. The thesis will suggest that 
NATO remains a collective defense organization, a principal political and military 
instrument, which affirms the evident connection between the member states on 
both sides of the Atlantic Ocean. 
The main argument of the thesis is that NATO, despite the fears to the 
contrary, has proven to be a strong alliance which, through its institutional 
evolution, has managed to withstand major external strains.  Moreover, by 
continuing to demonstrate such adaptive and agile behavior, the Alliance will 
withstand future crises. This is of particular importance in contemporary times as 
NATO is an active player in the Global War on Terror. The major source of the 
Alliance’s agility is provided by the strength that emanates from the Treaty 
governing NATO and binding its member states. Furthermore, this thesis will 
provide evidence to support the argument that NATO, as an institution, remains 
central to the International System due to the fundamental cohesion provided by 
Article 5, which, through Article 6, binds the Euro-Atlantic area. Moreover, the 
thesis will examine the power of cooperation embodied in Article 4 of the North 
Atlantic Treaty, and will spotlight the internal functions that have been developed 
within the Alliance. 
The thesis will conclude by arguing that NATO remains a vital actor in the 
international scene capable of undertaking political initiatives, combined with 
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military action, to promote stability.1 Despite occasional crises and internal 
disagreements, NATO, as an institution, remains strong and relevant in the 
modern era. It is still serving the Allied interests, as has always been the case, 
and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future. 
 
C. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES 
Wherever possible the research will exploit primary sources. A number of 
these derive from the documents found in the volumes of the U.S. Foreign 
Relations and NATO’s declassified documents and studies. In addition, the thesis 
will conduct an analysis of pertinent events and their implications for the Alliance, 
by citing relevant primary sources such as telegrams exchanged between the 
U.S. Mission to NATO and the Department of State.  
Moreover, the thesis will utilize suitable secondary sources as appropriate. 
Historical resources, based on declassified documents, will provide the 
necessary material of research. Numerous sources containing reports of 
pertinent events will be utilized, such as archives, newspaper Articles, 
specialized magazines, and journals. 
The evolution of NATO, and in particular, Articles 4, 5, and 6 of the 
Washington Treaty, will be examined by use of case studies to exploit the 
advantages provided by historical hindsight. By utilizing the case study method, 
this thesis will attempt to derive a conclusive general pattern pertinent to the 
evolution of the Articles in question and determine how NATO has been 
consolidated in to the International System. 
The thesis will examine the evolution of the Alliance in relation to the 
aforementioned Articles by analyzing the following events: 
                                                 
1 NATO was conceived as a regional defense organization in the context of the United Nations 
Charter. However, it plausible to argue that NATO is transforming to become a global reach Alliance 
to promote political stability wherever the Allies deem necessary.  
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• The establishment and development of the politico-military consultation 
processes and norms inside the Alliance (1948-1956). During the early 
years, a set of comprehensive studies was conducted that proved the 
necessity for politico-military consultation and its diachronism. These 
studies provide the necessary premise for cooperation among member 
states. 
• The Suez crisis of 1956 which provides historical evidence of the 
ramifications resulting from lack of consultation between the Allied 
nations. 
• The Arab-Israeli War of October 1973 (The Yom Kippur war) and the 
Defensive Condition Three (DEFCON III) promulgation of the U.S. 
strategic and conventional forces worldwide, which provide a sort of 
symmetrical image of the Suez crisis. 
• The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War (1988-
1991). While the prime enemy evaporated NATO remained in place 
despite speculations heralding its dissolution. Moreover the Alliance 
adapted to the new strategic environment and by adopting new 
policies, managed to withstand the external vibrations of that period. 
The aforementioned events are cited because they represent major 
milestones in the evolution of the Alliance. These events led NATO to pursue 
cooperation in more elaborate ways and fostered development of cooperative 
strategies and techniques between the Allies. The case study methodology is 
utilized as it provides an adequate survey of historical events. Moreover, the 
thesis will attempt to place pertinent events in their appropriate context. In other 
words, by using four cases studies, this thesis will try not to proliferate further the 
abundant bibliography that already exists, but will provide a critical view of the 
events and the diversity of policies that followed. Furthermore, the thesis will 
attempt to explore the existence of a pattern that leads the Alliance to a potential  
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crisis situation in relation to the aforementioned Articles. Moreover the study will 
examine the departure points after such events that initiate a set of actions to 
readjust allied policies. 
Last but not least, the thesis will examine NATO’s reaction towards the 
novel strategic landscape stemming from the terrorist attacks of September 11, 
2001 in the United States. Furthermore, besides the horrific events, Allied 
solidarity was expressed in the most palpable manner by the Allied invocation of 
Article 5. 
 
D. CHAPTER BY CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Chapter II will provide a brief examination of the Alliance in the context of 
International Relations theory. The aforementioned Articles will be scrutinized to 
extract their deeper meanings and their role in the shaping of Allied strategies 
and policies. This chapter will also provide an analysis of each individual article. 
Relevant principal strategic documents of the Alliance, as well as historic events 
and their repercussions, will be examined to elaborate the study further 
Chapter III will present a survey of NATO’s evolution as an institution over 
its life span, by examining four distinct case studies. Furthermore, it will present 
allied strategies and policies as they were formulated through the interaction of 
the Alliance with its external environment. The four case studies will be used to 
unfold NATO’s evolution through major historic events that will be utilized and 
cited for this purpose.  
Chapter IV will discuss the study of the events from 1999 to present as 
they relate to NATO. It will show this period is marked by a major historic event 
pertinent to the Alliance and its core concept, the collective defense pledge. The 
invocation of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty after the attacks of September 
11, 2001, present, in its own right, a major political event. The Alliance fulfilled its 
most basic and fundamental duty; to provide collective defense guarantees and 
the necessary actions to support them in the case of an external attack to one of 
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the Allies. Furthermore, this chapter will show that during this era the Alliance 
assumed an active role outside the core transatlantic region, as articulated in 
Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty. 
Chapter V will conclude with the assertion that in contemporary times 
NATO remains the only multinational, integrated, and institutionalized alliance 
that can operate, as and where deemed necessary by the member nations.  
Moreover, this chapter will also show that the Alliance is a politico-military forum 
where Allies are able to cooperate to reach common decisions based on 























II. NATO IN THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS CONTEXT 
ALLIANCE THEORY AND THE ESSENCE OF ARTICLES 4, 5 AND 
6 OF THE WASHINGTON TREATY OF 1949 
A. NATO UNDER THE ALLIANCE THEORY PERSPECTIVE 
Alliance theory is considered “one of the most underdeveloped areas …”2 
of international relations theory. The two schools of thought that dominate this 
field are referred to as neorealism3 and institutionalism. This part of the chapter 
will address the issue of NATO’s enduring existence, from an alliance theory 
perspective, despite the collapse of the causa causanas that spurred its birth. In 
other words, it will address the questions, why has NATO outlived its primordial 




Realism considers power to be the dominant force that states seek in 
order to ensure their existence in an anarchical world system where there is 
“unregulated competition of states.”4 For realists, cooperation among states 
exists “in order to balance against the greatest threat(s) they face….”5  As Walt 
points out, “…offensive alliances are generally more fragile than defensive 
ones.”6 
                                                 
2 Glenn H. Snyder, "Alliances, Balance, and Stability - The Origins of Alliances by Stephen M. 
Walt The Balance of Power: Stability in International Systems by Emerson M. S. Niou, Peter C. 
Ordeshook and Gregory F. Rose," International Organization, 45 Winter (1991) as cited in Robert B. 
McCalla, "NATO's persistence after the Cold War," International Organization, 50 Summer (1996): 
445.  
3 Derived form realism which is described in the seminal works of H. J. Morgenthau (Politics 
Among Nations) and E. H. Carr (The Twenty Years Crisis 1919 – 1939), neorealism’s most prominent 
representative is Kenneth Waltz. 
4 Robert O. Keohane, Neorealism and its critics, The Political economy of international change 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1986).  
5 Stephen M. Walt, "Why alliances endure or collapse," Survival, 39 Spring (1997): 158.  
6 Ibid., 159. 
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Thus, an alliance of defensive nature, such as NATO,7 is more resistant to 
external pressures, including the elimination of a prime enemy. For the realist 
and neorealist schools of thought, international organizations or regimes “exist to 
bolster or protect the power of the hegemon or primary powers.”8 At the same 
time, realist theories reveal their weaknesses when they are called to explain 
how smaller states influence the decisions of a leader ally.9 
Because NATO is considered, in these terms, to be a “deviant case”10, a 
more elaborate approach to the reasons that have led to its persistence is useful. 
In particular, a reverse argument can be applied to Walt’s rationale. According to 
Walt, “[a]lliances are most commonly regarded as a response to an external 
threat”11, and moreover, “[t]he most obvious and important cause [that leads 
Alliances to deteriorate and dissolve] is change in the identity or nature of the 
threat that produced the original association.”12 In other words, because there is 
significant change in the “balance-of-threat,”13 and thus according to the pertinent 
theory, since the enemy, the Warsaw pact, disappeared, NATO had no 
perceptible reason to exist. 
However, NATO did not disappear. It has remained an active actor in the 
international scene. While the alliance theory under the realist lens may provide 
                                                 
7 Based on the arguments projected by Stephen M. Walt, "Why alliances endure or collapse," 
Survival, 39 Spring (1997) NATO is a defensive alliance since it was not conceived “… to provide the 
means the means for an attack on some third party….” Ibid., 157.  The Soviet Union and its Allies, 
needless to say, saw things differently. 
8 Tom Lansford, All for one: terrorism, NATO and the United States, (Burlington, VT.: Ashgate, 
2002), 10.  
9 For further elaborate analysis see Thomas Risse-Kappen, Cooperation Among Democracies: 
The European Influence On U.S. Foreign Policy, Princeton studies in international history and politics 
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995), . 
10 Robert B. McCalla, "NATO's persistence after the Cold War," International Organization, 50 
Summer (1996): 447. 
11 Stephen M. Walt, "Why alliances endure or collapse," Survival, 39 Spring (1997): 159. 
12 Ibid., 163. 
13 James E. Dougherty, Pfaltzgraff, Robert L. Jr., Contending Theories of International 
Relations: a Comprehensive Survey, 4th ed. (New York: Longman, 1996), 304. 
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some persuasive arguments in more “classic” pre-Second World War Alliances14 
or coalitions formed under coercion and intimidation, it seems to lose explanatory 
power in the case of NATO. What this implies is that NATO is not a simple 
alliance created at the behest of balance-of-power or balance-of-threat. There 
are additional considerations to be accounted for that that have led to NATO’s 
persistence. Those can be found in liberalism, institutionalism, and the related 
theories. 
 
2. Liberalism, Idealism and Liberal Institutionalism 
On the antipode of neorealism lay the theories of liberalism and idealism 
which apply mostly to “domestic politics and domestic structures….”15 Unlike 
realist theories, “liberal theories of international relations emphasize domestic 
and transnational groups of individuals affecting state interests and 
preferences.”16 Idealists deplore the notion of power and the preservation of 
balance-of-power politics, and favor instead “general democratization, national 
self determination, and the organization of a peaceful international order by 
intrinsically pacific states.”17 Such ideals were promoted by President Wilson 
when he deplored the balance of power system in favor of a “community of 
power.”18  
Liberal institutionalism and regime theory, in the case of NATO, are 
utilized to provide explanations for the divergence of opinions expressed among 
the Allies. Furthermore, they account for the synthesis of ideas expressed by the 
Alliance. Since in democracies, parties “resolve disputes by means of dialogue, 
                                                 
14 Like the Romania’s alignment with the Axis powers during the Second World War etc. 
15 Thomas Risse-Kappen, Cooperation Among Democracies: The European Influence On U.S. 
Foreign Policy, Princeton studies in international history and politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 1995), 25. Furthermore, one can take into account Organizational Theory to explain 
NATO’s persistence. 
16 Ibid., 25-26. 
17 David S. Yost, NATO Transformed: The Alliance’s New Roles in International Security, 
(Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace Press, 1997), 10. 
18 Ibid., 11. 
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consensus, and compromise, the same norms tend to be applied to coalitions of 
democratic states.” Democracies externalize their internal norms when 
cooperating with each other.19 Moreover, the theory provides a solution for the 
distrust among state actors, as exemplified by the “prisoner’s dilemma.”20 The 
prisoner’s dilemma is a scenario in which players interact “without a central 
authority to force them to cooperate with each other.”21 Institutions, according to 
institutional liberalism, provide a means to overcome the prisoner’s dilemma by 
providing a necessary framework of cooperation with established rules and 
norms that address the issue of constraining the participating states. In such a 
manner, NATO functions as a collective instrument comprised of democracies 
where there is tolerance for different views in its internal procedures. On the 
other hand, in its external relations, the Alliance exhibits resilience and functions 
as a resolute body of common ideas and perceptions in support of the common 
policies and strategies of the Allied nations. 
In the case of NATO “one has to understand the dynamics of its behavior 
as an organization, the interplay of member interests within the security regime 
that surrounds NATO and the opportunities and constraints of the domestic 
political considerations”22  
NATO is both a security regime and an Alliance. As an Alliance, it “is a 
formal commitment for security cooperation”23 among its member state. On the 
other hand, as a security regime, it is 
[a mechanism] for aggregating the capabilities of [its member] 
states in situations in which individually the states have 
                                                 
19 David S. Yost, NATO Transformed: The Alliance’s New Roles in International Security, 
(Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace Press, 1997), 33. 
20 For further elaboration on the “prisoner’s dilemma” which addresses the issue of cooperation 
“in world without central authority” see Robert M. Axelrod, The evolution of cooperation, (New York: 
Basic Books, 1984). 
21 Ibid., 6. 
22 Robert B. McCalla, "NATO's persistence after the Cold War," International Organization, 50 
Summer (1996): 446-447. 
23 Stephen M. Walt, "Why alliance endure or collapse," Survival, 39 Spring (1997): 157. 
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inadequate capability to deal with threats that confront them.  In 
fact, the scale required to generate the capability to assure 
survival often exceeds that of any one state, so that cooperation 
becomes necessary.24 
In sum, institutionalist and liberal theories provide a more satisfactory 
paradigm for understanding NATO’s case, since the Atlantic Alliance does not fall 
in the category of traditional alliances that stand only for mutual defense. 
Furthermore, the examination of NATO’s persistence, on a theoretical basis, 
constitutes the first evidence that NATO is more than an ordinary military 
alliance. 
 
B. THE ESSENCE OF ARTICLES 4, 5 AND 6 OF THE WASHINGTON 
TREATY 194925 
Articles 4, 5 and 6 are the foundation of the Washington Treaty since they 
constitute the core of the Alliance, or at least its major portion. Article 4 
establishes the consultation norm among the Allies for issues pertaining to the 
security of the Allied nations. Moreover, it is the only article that explicitly refers 
explicitly to the consultation as a procedure.26 Article’s 4 wording compels (“will 
consult”) the Allies to consult with their partners whenever there are 
considerations raised to a wide range of issues which have an impact on the 
Allies’ such as “the territorial integrity, political independence or security.” Article 
5 is the collective defense clause. It constitutes the fundamental pledge of the 
                                                 
24 Katja Weber, "Hierarchy amidst anarchy: A transaction costs approach to international 
security cooperation," International Studies Quarterly, 41 Jun (1997): 326. 
25 It is imperative at this point to note the importance of Articles 2, 3 and 9 of the North 
Atlantic Treaty by virtue of their interrelation to the Articles employed in this study. Article 2 (a.k.a. 
the “Canadian article”) refers to the economic cooperation between the Allies and their free 
institutions. It emphasizes the necessity of “stability and well-being.” Article 3 (self help) stipulates 
the axiom of self help which leads to the effective collective defense. Finally, Article 9 establishes 
the North Atlantic Council, the only body directly derived from the treaty. The Council is also given 
the power to establish “subsidiary bodies as may be necessary.” Moreover the Article stipulates 
that the North Atlantic Council will establish “immediately a defense committee” to provide the 
necessary steps of implementing collective defense. 
26 Escott Reid, Time of fear and hope: the making of the North Atlantic Treaty, 1947-1949, 
(Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1977), 164. 
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Allies to contribute “as deemed necessary,” including “the use of armed force[s]” 
to the benefit of the partner(s) under threat or attack. Finally, Article 6 defines the 
geographic area where the force of the previous article applies. It does not, 
however, limit the consultation norm of Article 4. This means that if any of the 
Allies feel their interests are threatened in any geographic location, they can 
invoke Article 4, since consultation is mandatory. What follows is a more 
elaborate analysis of these three Articles and their impact on the policies of the 
Allies. 
 
1. Article 4 
The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of 
them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of 
any of the Parties is threatened.27 
Article 4 of the Washington Treaty sets the necessary provisions of the 
consultation process inside NATO. It establishes the premise that the Alliance is 
a forum governed by the freedom of expression of ideas. It implicitly provides a 
stepping stone to consensus among the Allies, and provides a connection to the 
subsequent article, Article 5, which discusses those issues subject to 
consultation. The threat of territorial integrity, political independence, and security 
may stem from differing factors that do not explicitly touch upon issues of 
defense in a narrow sense, but from political, economic, or other non-military 
means, like trade, sanctions and so on. 
Consultation is an indispensable element of the consensus building 
process inside the Alliance. Despite the divergent nature of the Allies in issues 
like culture, military and economic power, or national interest, etc., the 
consultation process established in Article 4 provides the necessary framework to 
bridge these differences and foster cooperation among the Allied nations. Since 
                                                 
27 North Atlantic Treaty Organization - Office of Information and Press, NATO Handbook, 
(Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 2001), 527-530. 
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NATO is an alliance of democracies,28 through the consultation processes, the 
Allies manage to overcome their differences and pursue their common interests. 
From the consultation process derives the intrinsic ability of every ally, either 
small or big, to influence the Alliance. As the Committee of the “Three Wise Men” 
has pointed out, “[t]he Atlantic powers already possess in the North Atlantic 
Council (NAC) an instrument of unity and a forum for consultation regarding 
policies of general interest.”29 
Moreover, Article 4 implicitly states that such an exchange of opinions is 
an obligation of the member nations towards the Alliance. The article stipulates 
broad notions where consultation is applied. Furthermore, the commitment of the 
Allies to the consultation “norm” provides the necessary basis for exchange of 
information among them which in turn leads to the fulfilment of the NATO’s 
“internal functions.” As Professor Yost points out: 
Although these internal functions may be categorized and defined 
in various ways, at least eight have been identified: maintaining 
U.S. engagement in European security, resolving intra-West 
European security dilemmas, reassuring Germany's neighbors and 
Allies, limiting the scope of nuclear proliferation in NATO Europe, 
promoting a certain "denationalization" of defense planning, 
providing a forum for the coordination of Western security policies, 
supplying economic benefits to all the Allies, and encouraging and 
legitimizing democratic forms of government.30  
                                                 
28 While this is not entirely accurate since Portugal, one of the founding members of the Alliance, 
was not a democratic state but under the Salazar Regime. Moreover during the course of NATO’s 
existence military coups were established in Greece (1967) and Turkey (1960 and 1980); however, 
many argue that the Alliance is a promoter of democracy and has taken steps towards that direction, 
most notably after the changes in the European strategic environment in the post 1989 era. 
Furthermore, NATO in 1999 launched the Membership Action Plan (MAP) which provides certain 
guidelines for the countries aspiring membership, including among the former prerequisites such as 
democratic norms, civilian control of the military etc. For further details see North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization - Office of Information and Press, NATO Handbook, (Brussels: NATO Office of 
Information and Press, 2001), 65-67, and North Atlantic Council, Membership Action Plan [Internet] 
(1999, accessed 9/28 2004); available from http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-066e.htm.  
29 G. Martino, H. Lange, and L. Pearson, Text of the Report of the Committee of Three on Non-
Military Cooperation in NATO (NAC Dec. 13, 1956) [Internet] (1956, accessed 9/28 2004); available 
from http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/bt-a3.htm.  
30 David S. Yost, NATO Transformed: The Alliance’s New Roles in International Security, 
(Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace Press, 1997), 50. 
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From the aforementioned eight functions it is deemed necessary to identify 
that the fifth function “…providing a forum for the coordination of Western 
security policies…” is directly associated with the consultation norm, as 
exhibited from the preceding analysis. 
Moreover, one can argue that all of NATO’s functions are in a more 
or less manner interconnected with the consultation norm and thus with 
each other. For example, the function of “resolving intra West European 
security dilemmas” could be achieved because NATO by solving the 
security dilemma [inter alia] “…in West European relations has facilitated 
the pursuit of economic and political cooperation a process that was 
deliberately urged and sponsored by the United States, building on the 
thought and work of Jean Monnet and other European advocates of such 
cooperation.”31 Elaborating further, there are scholars and diplomats who 
cite the role of the U.S. in resolving intra-NATO crises. The Greco-Turkish 
disputes are used as a tangible example of such resolution and conflict 
avoidance. However, opinions diverge and are either attributed to direct 
U.S. intervention and mediation, by application of unilateral “U.S. 
pressure,”32 or as others argue, due to the NATO membership that those 
two nations enjoy.33 Additionally, the consultation process provides a vehicle for 
all Allied nations to further promote their interdependence, by furnishing their 
common policies and strategies which in turn enhance allied solidarity and 
cohesion. It is noted that whenever, the consultation norm malfunctioned the 
consequences were embarrassing for the Alliance, or individual Allies, or for 
both. 
                                                 
31 David S. Yost, NATO Transformed: The Alliance’s New Roles in International Security, 
(Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace Press, 1997), 51. 
32 Ibid., 52. 
33 Lawrence S. Kaplan, The long entanglement: NATO’s first fifty years, (Westport, Conn.: 
Praeger, 1999), 228. 
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A brief comparative analysis of NATO Allies’ capability and political will to 
consult can be made using the Warsaw pact. The Atlantic Alliance was/is based 
on the premises of synthesis of different opinions. This attribute which derives 
from the basic values of democracy, provides the Alliance with the ability to 
tolerate controversial differences and diverse views, which are bridged through 
compromise, dialogue and consensus. In stark contrast stand out “Soviet 
forecasts of NATO’s demise [during the 1990-91 period which] were mistaken, 
partly because they were based on a false parallelism (equating NATO and the 
Warsaw Pact)[;]… the Warsaw Pact was a Soviet-organized body founded on 
coercion. It was an instrument of control…NATO, in contrast…emerged from… 
[the] democratic nations in Europe and North America.”34 Moreover, the Warsaw 
pact dissolved since the foundation that was built upon no longer existed due to 
the precipitating events of the late 1980s. As Gorbachev has stated “[h]e and his 
comrades concluded that it was really inconceivable that anyone in the White 
House actually wanted to blow up the Soviet Union…”35 
Moreover, in both the Strategic concepts of the Alliance, the first published 
during the London summit of 1991,36 and the second during the Washington 
summit of 1999,37 the “golden rule of consultation” is reiterated by reference to 
Article 4 of the Washington Treaty. By contrasting the pertinent articles in both 
strategic concepts, one can observe their stunning similarity in the paragraphs 
referring to the consultation process.38 
                                                 
34 David S. Yost, NATO Transformed: The Alliance’s New Roles in International Security, 
(Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace Press, 1997), 27-28. 
35 Robert G. Kaiser, "Gorbachev: 'We All Lost Cold War'," The Washington Post, 7/11/2004 
2004. 
36 North Atlantic Council, The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept [Internet] (NATO, 1991, 
accessed 9/28 2004); available from http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c911107a.htm#II.   
37 North Atlantic Council, The Alliance’s Strategic Concept [Internet] (NAC, 4/23/1999 1999, 
accessed 9/28 2004); available from http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm.  
38 The only difference is the omission of the word “essential” before the expression “transatlantic 
forum.” 
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Furthermore, on the plane of strategy and policy, closer examination of 
Article 4 reveals that it stipulates the general notion of “security” of the Allies.  
However, it provides no geographic restriction. In other words, while Articles 5 
and 6 link the Alliance through pledges for mutual defense in a defined area, 
Article 4 provides the springboard for security considerations no matter where the 
threat is originating from. 
 
2. Article 5 
The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of 
them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack 
against them all, and consequently they agree that, if such an 
armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of 
individual or collective self defence recognised by Article 51 of the 
Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so 
attacked by taking forthwith, individually, and in concert with the 
other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use 
of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North 
Atlantic area. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a 
result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council.  
Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has 
taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international 
peace and security.39 
The most fundamental premise revolving around the notion of every 
military alliance was and remains“…the undertaking of each of the Allies to come 
immediately to the assistance of another member of the alliance if it is subjected 
to an armed attack.”40 In NATO’s case, the provision of mutual assistance is 
provided in Article 5. This article was and remains the core of the Alliance, since 
it contains pledges for the collective security of the Allies. Furthermore, the 
historical facts of the formation of NATO reflect the considerations of the Allies on 
both sides of the Atlantic, embodied in the Treaty of Washington. While Article 5 
                                                 
39 North Atlantic Treaty Organization - Office of Information and Press, NATO Handbook, 
(Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 2001), 528. 
40 Escott Reid, Time of fear and hope: the making of the North Atlantic Treaty, 1947-1949, 
(Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1977), 143. 
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like the Treaty itself does not name a specific enemy, was at the time directed to 
counter and deter Soviet expansionism and militarization. 
Moreover, the mutual defense pledges consolidated U.S. involvement in 
European affairs since U.S. security is inextricable with that of Europe.  By virtue 
of the intrinsic characteristics of the article (under the notion “one for all and all 
for one”) the Atlantic Alliance transformed the longstanding U.S. foreign policy for 
Hemispheric defense, envisioned by Franklin Delano Roosevelt (FDR), based on 
the axiom that the Western Hemisphere“ was a “separate system of interests” 
and sanctuary of civilized values.”41 Instead, under the Soviet threat, the Atlantic 
became an ocean that connected the two continents in many different ways but 
most importantly through the mutual defense pledges of Article 5. 
At this point it is essential to note that “[the U.S. pledge for assistance 
including military action in a quasi-automated form] was a revolutionary 
commitment in view of its [U.S.’s] political tradition of isolationism and [policies of] 
avoiding “entangling alliances” in peacetime.”42 In other words, the Atlantic 
Alliance, and particularly Article 5, curbed the “longstanding suspicions that… 
[the U.S.] would be made victims of European exploitation, which they perceived 
to have been the case from the Napoleonic wars to World War I.”43  The notion to 
“bring the boys home” is very eloquently put in FDR’s wording to Churchill in 
1944: “You know of course that after Germany’s collapse I must bring American 
troops home as rapidly as transportation problems will permit.”44 Additionally, the 
positive conviction of American Secretary of State Dean Acheson before the 
Senate Committee during the deliberations to ratify the treaty, that there was no 
                                                 
41 John Lamberton Harper, American Visions Of Europe: Franklin D. Roosevelt, George F. 
Kennan, and Dean G. Acheson, (Cambridge ; New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 63. 
42 David S. Yost, NATO Transformed: The Alliance’s New Roles in International Security, 
(Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace Press, 1997), 29. 
43 Lawrence S. Kaplan, The long entanglement: NATO’s first fifty years, (Westport, Conn.: 
Praeger, 1999), 3. 
44 John Lamberton Harper, American Visions Of Europe: Franklin D. Roosevelt, George F. 
Kennan, and Dean G. Acheson, (Cambridge ; New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 
117. 
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prospect of sending “substantial number[s] [of] troops abroad”45 reflects the U.S. 
notion of avoidance of peacetime alliances. However, the vibrations caused by 
the politico-military expansionism of Soviet Communism made imperative the 
involvement of the U.S. in Europe through the Atlantic Alliance. 
While Article 5 constitutes for the U.S. a major departure form the “political 
traditions of isolationism,”46 for the European Allies, though it did not stipulate the 
automatic functions and provisions of the treaty of Brussels,47 it ensured that the 
U.S. would be actively engaged in the defense of Europe against any Soviet 
aggression through the reassurance provided by the monopoly of atomic 
weapons. Moreover, it created the necessary conditions for the reintegration of 
Germany in the European system of states by reassuring the Allies against any 
German resurgence. 
Furthermore, it is notable that the provisions of the Article define a 
“blurred” line between automatic reactions and strict undeniable commitments,  
                                                 
45 Dean Acheson, Present at the creation; my years in the State Department, 1st ed. (New 
York,: Norton, 1969), 285. 
46 David S. Yost, NATO Transformed: The Alliance’s New Roles in International Security, 
(Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace Press, 1997), 29.  
47 Yale Law School Avalon-Project, Treaty of Economic, Social, and Cultural collaboration and 
Collective Self-defense (Brussels Treaty), March 17, 1948 [Internet] (Yale Law School, 10/6/2004 
1998, accessed 9/28 2004); available from 
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/intdip/westeu/we001.htm.  was concluded among the BENELUX 
countries, France and Great Britain and along with “…President Truman’s special message to the 
U.S. Congress requesting authorization to reinstate conscription and universal military training…” are 
considered as the pretext of the North Atlantic Treaty; for further study see William R. Keylor, The 
Twentieth-Century World: An International History, 4th ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2001), 267-273. 
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binding the Allies in conditions that do not yet exist or could potentially exist by a 
minor reaction in an otherwise minor incident.48 
The North Atlantic Treaty was the centerpiece of U.S. strategy at the time 
it was concluded. It was intended to provide security and stability for the 
economic recovery of Europe, and secure it from Soviet aggression (either direct 
or indirect). It also contributed to the European unification, but also to the 
fundamental change of attitude in Europe, that had incurred two devastating 
World Wars, in thirty years. 
In addition, even after the end of the Cold War, NATO relies on the 
collective defense clause that Article 5 contains, as this has been reiterated in the 
Alliance’s strategic concept of 1999.49 It is the essence of this Article that 
provides the incentives for the countries of former Eastern Europe in their 
aspirations to join the Alliance. Moreover, it provides perhaps the strongest 
commitment that a sovereign nation can make today, to commit armed forces to 
fight for an allied partner against an external aggressor. 
 
3. Article 6 
For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the Parties 
is deemed to include an armed attack:  
                                                 
48 During the negotiations for the conclusion of the Treaty there was an extensive debate as to 
how far and by what wording would the obligations of the Allies be defined in respect to the mutual 
contribution in an armed attack. The precedents of the recently concluded Rio Treaty (Yale Law 
School Avalon-Project, Rio De Janeiro Conference for the Maintenance of Continental Peace and 
Security, August 15- September 2, 1947 [Internet] (Yale Law School, 10/6/2004 1998, accessed 9/28 
2004); available from http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/decade/decad061) and the aforementioned 
Treaty of Brussels, provided the initial grounds of debate. Moreover, the U.S. JCS raised objections 
to the extent of Article 5 (for further details see Lawrence S. Kaplan, The long entanglement: NATO’s 
first fifty years, (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1999), 3-4, and Escott Reid, Time of fear and hope: the 
making of the North Atlantic Treaty, 1947-1949, (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1977), 147-148. 
Finally the actual text of Article 5 was not as explicit as Article IV of the Brussels treaty on the use of 
armed forces; however, the provisions of the article include an iron-clad, explicit reference to the use 
of armed force “…as deemed necessary…” In other words, Article 5 stands out as compromise 
between the anxieties expressed by the Europeans on one hand, and those of the U.S. Senate as 
the only constitutionally mandated legislative body authorized to declare war in the U.S., on the other 
(for further details see Ibid., 155-156). 
49 North Atlantic Council, The Alliance’s Strategic Concept [Internet] (NAC, 4/23/1999 1999, 
accessed 9/28 2004); available from http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm.  
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- on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, 
on the Algerian Departments of France, on the territory of Turkey or 
on the islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the 
North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer; 
- on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or 
over these territories or any area in Europe in which occupation 
forces of any of the Parties were stationed on the date when the 
Treaty entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea or the North 
Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer.50 
Article 6 of the Washington Treaty stipulates the geographic area of the 
Article 5 commitments. It confines the Allied pledge in a well defined geographic 
area, but it does not bind general Allied interests geographically. In other words, 
while it defines the area where Article 5 is applied for the purposes of collective 
defense, it creates no geographic restrictions on either consultation, or protection 
of allied interests. One can plausibly argue that the first out-of-area issue for 
NATO was raised even before the Alliance acquired “flesh and bones.” The 
debate of whether Italy should be incorporated in the first tier of nations forming 
the Alliance and subsequently Greece and Turkey (to defuse further Soviet 
encroachment against these nations), was the first form of deliberations inside 
the Alliance, with relevance to the geographic area coverage of the Treaty. 
Finally, through a compromise, for various strategic and political reasons 
(domestic and foreign), the Allies extended the notion of defense of the “North 
Atlantic area”51 to incorporate Italy, as one of the original signatories, and 
subsequently after three years, Greece and Turkey, who joined the Alliance.52  
For NATO it was the Korean War, which led to the creation of the military 
structure and supportive bureaucracy,53 clearly an out-of-area issue. Several 
                                                 
50 North Atlantic Treaty Organization - Office of Information and Press, NATO Handbook, 
(Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 2001), 528. 
51 Escott Reid, Time of fear and hope: the making of the North Atlantic Treaty, 1947-1949, 
(Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1977), 103. 
52 For further details see Ibid., 200-201, Don Cook, Forging the alliance: NATO 1945-1950, 1st 
U.S. ed. (New York: Arbor House, 1989), 214-217, Dean Acheson, Present at the creation; my years 
in the State Department, 1st ed. (New York,: Norton, 1969), 279. 
53 Ian Q. R. Thomas, The Promise of Alliance: NATO and the Political Imagination, (Lanham, 
Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1997), 29. 
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other cases of out-of-area considerations can also be recalled during the Cold 
War era, two of which (the Suez crisis of 1956, and Yom Kippur War of 1973) will 
be examined in a following chapter of this thesis. 
“Though out-of-area concerns had been of great importance since NATO’s 
founding,”54 the Alliance during the Cold War was focused on the security of 
Europe. The European theatre was considered the major area of confrontation. 
Furthermore, focus of NATO’s responsibility geographically precluded disputes 
among the Allies pertinent to “decolonization conflicts…and non-European 
engagements of the United States.”55 While the geographic limits of NATO’s 
responsibility have been a contentious issue for the Allies, most out-of-area 
incidents during the Cold War era fell “within the national competence of those 
allied governments which happen[ed] or wish[ed] to be involved.”56 
However, the demise of the Soviet Union created new challenges for the 
Alliance in its immediate area of primary interest with the crises in former 
Yugoslavia. Thus, two concepts were introduced pertinent to Allied operations in 
out-of-area operations. The first was the introduction of the so called “non-Article 
5” operations (mostly in the form of Peace Support Operations (PSO) and Peace 
Keeping Operations (PKO)). These are operations pertaining to the direct 
interests of the Alliance, which, nevertheless, do not take the form of an armed 
attack against any of its members. Moreover, the effect of such events that fall 
under this category can have a diverse magnitude of concern on different Allies, 
and thus the interest of supporting such operations in the context of the Alliance 
can also vary. In other words some Allies may pursue vigorously such operations 
and others may not. However, the latter do not impede nor fall short of Allied 
obligations and thus serve the Alliance.  The second concept was the 
                                                 
       54 Ian Q. R. Thomas, The Promise of Alliance: NATO and the Political Imagination, (Lanham, 
Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1997), 128. 
55 David S. Yost, NATO Transformed: The Alliance’s New Roles in International Security, 
(Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace Press, 1997), 189. 
56 Marc Bentinck, NATO's out-of-area problem, Adelphi papers, no. 211 (London: International 
Institute for Strategic Studies, 1986), 9.  
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establishment of the Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF), where combined 
denotes cooperation among Allies and partners, and joint refers to the fact that it 
employs forces for all types of operations.  This model incorporates Allied and 
cooperative nations either under the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, 
aspiring Allies, or Russia and/or Ukraine. 
The conceptual approach of the Allies to out-of-area operations adopting 
the concepts of non-Article 5 operations and CJTF is one side of the coin. On the 
other side, there are a number of issues raised, which are pertinent to the 
material support of such operations, such as, infrastructure demands, assets, 
and furthermore political issues as to the usefulness of conducting such 
operations, public opinion support, and Allied cohesiveness. NATO is the only 
military Alliance at present with the ability to undertake operations outside of its 
territorial range, despite any bitter rhetoric surfacing.57 Moreover, the non-Article 
5 operations are not strictly attached to the Euro-Atlantic Area covered explicitly 
by the Washington Treaty. 
The first Gulf War of 1991 was the first tangible operation in which 
practical out-of-area issues were raised. However, NATO forces 
while not being on the ground under the Allied banner used 
extensively the Allied infrastructure.58  
In addition, Allied interdependence was tested successfully (more or less) 
and provided the necessary prerequisites for conducting multinational coalition 
operations. 
The assertion that demands for out-of-area operations will most likely 
develop outside the Euro-Atlantic Area seems plausible and logical, empirical 
evidence advocates that “[t]he majority of future crises will likely fall into what was 
                                                 
57 Graeme Herd, "Out of area, out of business?," The World Today, 60 Aug/Sep (2004): 4-6. In 
short Herd argues that it’s better to have a strong ruler in both Afghanistan and Iraq than to have a 
failed state. Moreover he argues that NATO fell short of expectations with the stabilization forces 
deployed in Afghanistan and also foreordains NATO’s failure in Afghanistan Moreover he asserts that 
NATO’s ISAF leadership, support and participation is a like an Article 5 operation.  
58 Ian Q. R. Thomas, The Promise of Alliance: NATO and the Political Imagination, (Lanham, 
Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1997), 158-159. 
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formerly considered "out of area" [or what the term really denotes].  While 
Alliance members were required to consult with each other when their security 
was threatened beyond NATO'S boundaries, the alliance, or a group of alliance 
members, was not prohibited from acting together in other areas. But what was 
once an ad hoc and almost tangential alliance activity will now move to center 
stage. NATO members, therefore, must be able to assemble a coalition quickly, 
fashion policy and strategy, create a command staff, deploy forces, and build a 
support infrastructure.”59 While the aforementioned extract sounds coherent, it is 
imperative that it is supplemented by the following remarks: 
To “assemble a coalition quickly” does not mean that a coalition should be 
brought together without the consultation process taking place with all the Allies. 
This requires that Article 4 must be the basis for the formation of coalitions, 
through consensus. Moreover consultation is the only plausible tool for reaching 
an agreement among democracies. Paraphrasing Winston Churchill, one can 
argue that, consultation is the worst form of discussion we have among 
democracies, except for all those others that have been tried. 
To “fashion policy and strategy, create a command staff” means in other 
words to apply and comply the strategic concept of 1999.  While “deploy forces” 
resonates in the strategic concept of 1999, it has found a more eloquent 
expression in the Prague Capabilities Commitment process.  To “build a support 
infrastructure” would be more appropriate than to adapt the existing infrastructure 
to the new requirement and supplement it where weaknesses arise. 
Finally, it can be argued that as almost every other aspect of NATO’s 
fundamentals, the geographic area in which the Alliance can undertake new roles 
has been transformed as this has been articulated in the 1999 Strategic Concept 
                                                 
59 Ronald D. Asmus, Richard L. Kugler, and Stephen F. Larrabee, "Building a new NATO," 
Foreign Affairs, 72 Sep/Oct (1993): 39. 
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of the Alliance.60 What needs to be done now is that “NATO should focus on 
improving forces that already exist rather than on creating new forces.”61 
 
C. CONCLUSION 
NATO is an Alliance of distinct powers, which have their own priorities and 
interests, emanating from the internal political dynamics of each member state. 
However, the collective security commitment embodied in Article 5 is an explicit 
guarantor of stability inside the Alliance, ensuring Allied cohesiveness. The 
Treaty is a simple document62 consisting of only fourteen Articles, which describe 
the rights and obligations of the member states in general terms. It does not 
specify any threat, and as it has been characterized by Secretary Acheson, it is a 
“part of an ancient historical evolution driven by the principals of democracy, 
individual liberty, and rule of law.”63 
“The kind of obligation entailed by the Washington Treaty is [that] the 
Parties agree to assist each other as best they can in given circumstances, while 
reserving the right to consult their own interests in determining the form that such 
assistance should take. This becomes an especially important question when 
considering the extension of the American "nuclear umbrella" to Europe. Doing 
so required America's European partners to believe that the U.S. would expose 
its own population to a nuclear attack in order to defend them.64 
                                                 
60 North Atlantic Council, The Alliance’s Strategic Concept [Internet] (NAC, 7/10/2000 1991, 
accessed 10/6 2004); available from http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b911108a.htm.  
61 Ronald D. Asmus, Richard L. Kugler, and Stephen F. Larrabee, "Building a new NATO," 
Foreign Affairs, 72 Sep/Oct (1993): 40. 
62 It was so characterized by President Truman, and 54 years later Lord Robertson notes  
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Omaha;” see George Robertson, "The Omaha Milkman Today: NATO's Transformation - An Agenda 
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(2004).  
63 Ian Q. R. Thomas, The Promise of Alliance: NATO and the Political Imagination, (Lanham, 
Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1997), 21. 
 64 Interview of the author with Thesis Co-Advisor, Professor D. J. Moran, at the Naval 
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Moreover, while the notion of collective defense of the Euro-Atlantic area 
remains the central theme for NATO, the Alliance had to readjust the means and 
the policies to the mandates of the Strategic Concept of 1999.  In other words, a 
new dual track policy has to be applied and supported. By and large, NATO was 
“not typical of the ad hoc alliances used so extensively in the modern Europe, to 
meet a particular crisis nor to wage any war; nor it is typical of the treaties 
designed to achieve a delicate balancing of power.”65 Furthermore, as a peace 
time Alliance experiment for the U.S., NATO represented a major departure from 
the previous approaches towards Europe as it demonstrated that “[t]he security 
of Western Europe and North America were inseparably linked.”66 
“Despite academic predictions that its years are numbered, NATO persists 
and adapts.”67  NATO has exhibited its institutional adaptability by readjusting its 
organization to fulfil the strategic demands of contemporary times.  The Alliance 
has deployed forces in support of operations outside the context of Article 5, the 
non-Article 5 operations, but within the frame of the fundamental principles of the 
North Atlantic Treaty. Thus, NATO keeps the pledge fulfilled when and where 
issues pertinent to the collective defense of the Allies occur. 
                                                 
 65 Congressional Record (5 July 1949); 8984 cited in Ian Q. R. Thomas, The Promise of 
Alliance: NATO and the Political Imagination, (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 
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III. THE EVOLUTION OF THE ALLIANCE AS AN INSTITUTION 
UNDER THE PERSPECTIVE OF ARTICLES 4, 5 AND 6 OF THE 
WASHINGTON TREATY 1949 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The nature of Allies is that they expect to be consulted.  We cannot 
share responsibility without sharing sensitive information and 
without discussing policy decisions that affect our Allies before the 
decisions are made.  We also expect that once our Allies 
understand and agree with a line of policy and action, they will raise 
the money, send the forces, or otherwise join in the action. 
There is no magic answer to the ticklish relationship that results 
from these mutual expectations among the Atlantic Allies.  But the 
best antidote to uncoordinated stupidity among friends is long, 
candid, and often tedious talk about real problems.68 
This chapter will examine four historical cases pertinent to Articles 4, 5 
and 6 of the Washington Treaty, and their impact on Allied policy and strategy. It 
will also illustrate how Articles 4 and 6 have revolved around Article 5, despite the 
different views and interpretations stemming from the divergent interests of the 
Allies, as well as, the spectacular, sometimes almost catastrophic results that 
may follow when consultation breaks down.69 The consultation process is 
double-edged. On one hand, Allies bring up issues pertinent to their security on a 
collective or individual basis, on the other hand, they reserve the right to consult 
                                                 
68 Harlan Cleveland, NATO: The Transatlantic Bargain, 1st ed. (New York,: Harper & Row, 1970), 13. 
Harlan Cleveland was the “U.S. Permanent Representative on the Council of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization, with the rank and status of Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary; until Jul 1, 1967, 
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Atlantic community. [Internet] (NATO, 10/23/2000 1956, accessed 10/10 2004); available from 
http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c560505a.htm.  
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as to what form of assistance they would provide, if needed. Or to a further 
extent, as Harlan Cleveland eloquently puts it: 
“Most of the arguments about allied consultation result from 
decisions by individual Allies to misplace a topic along this 
spectrum. ‘Are you telling us or consulting us?’ is the question most 
frequently asked when a topic is presented for discussion in the 
North Atlantic Council. The real answer often requires the 
questioner to ask himself another question in turn: ‘Do I want to 
take the responsibility of being consulted for real and contracting 
some obligation to act on (or to be restricted by) my own advice?’”70 
In the early NATO years, the Allies realized that in order for the Alliance to 
have an effect, it should produce a common policy, stemming from a common 
strategy. Despite the fact that this premise was no novelty71 in NATO’s case, 
most of the policies for “in-area” issues were consistent. Although strong debate 
might initially have overshadowed the political outcome, the Allies eventually 
found, and still do, common grounds in their understanding, accommodating their 
individual interests. 
Out-of-area issues have proven more problematic. The well-defined area 
of the Alliance in Article 6 leaves no margin for misjudgment on collective 
defense issues, should they arise in that area. On the other hand, there are 
occasions where the course of action chosen by some Allies to serve their 
interests in out-of-area issues, raise objections within the Atlantic community.  
Such objections are most acute when the actions are not shared within the 
Alliance and involve unilateral actions undertaken by a single ally, or a colluded 
                                                 
70 Harlan Cleveland, NATO: The Transatlantic Bargain, 1st ed. (New York,: Harper & Row, 1970), 
19. 
71 Most alliances, even those dominated by a single, all-powerful partner (like the 
Warsaw pact “run by Moscow with an iron fist”) have a clause pertinent to consultation (Warsaw 
pact Article 3) Yale Law School Avalon-Project, The Warsaw Security Pact: May 14, 1955 
[Internet] (Yale Law School, 10/6/2004 1998, accessed 9/28 2004); available from 
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/intdip/soviet/warsaw.htm. Yale Law School Avalon-Project, 
The Warsaw Security Pact: May 14, 1955 [Internet] (Yale Law School, 10/6/2004 1998, accessed 
9/28 2004); available from http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/intdip/soviet/warsaw.htm. For 
further details on how NATO was used as a model for the Warsaw pace see Gustav Schmidt, ed., 
A History of NATO - The First Fifty Years, 3 vols., vol. 2 (New York: Palgrave, 2001).  
 
 29
fait accompli stemming from the strict notion of serving national interests. Despite 
the fact that there are no practical geographical limits to the political consultation 
process for the members of the Alliance, Allies either small or big have failed 
occasionally to function to the benefit of common interest. Thus the main 
question of this chapter is how the procedures and norms set forth in the 
Washington Treaty affected the evolution of the Alliance. This question will be 
examined in two parts: the evolution of Allied cooperation inside the Alliance, and 
the effects of a failure to adhere to the consultation norm or the failure of the 
norm itself on the Alliance. 
To scrutinize these two parts of the question, this chapter will examine 
how the political consultation norm was established, and how it has evolved.  
Furthermore, it will also examine two distinct cases, the well-known and 
thoroughly examined, Suez crisis of 1956, which can be characterized as the 
Anglo-French collusion of 1956, and the unilateral actions of the U.S. 
administration during the October (Yom Kippur) War of 1973. Last but not least, it 
will examine briefly, the reaction of the Alliance to the unexpected end of the Cold 
War, and the dilemmas resulting from this new strategic environment. 
 
B. THE DEVELOPMENT AND ESTABLISHMENT OF THE POLITICO-
MILITARY CONSULTATION DURING THE COLD WAR 
 
1. General 
Consultation inside the Alliance is a free process which was developed 
during a series of situations that arose and did not necessarily involve any 
considerations stemming from issues of defense. The NAC, in which all member 
states participate through their permanent representatives (permreps, bearing 
ambassadorial credentials), convenes at least once a week. The NAC also 
convenes as needed at higher levels, such as Foreign Ministers, or Defense 
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Ministers, or even Heads of State and Government. Nonetheless, “its decisions 
have the same status and validity at what ever level it meets.”72 
The NAC is the only apparatus inside the Alliance deriving its authority 
directly from the Treaty (Article 9). “Meetings of the NAC have been utilized on 
several occasions for the discussion of political issues related to security.73 In 
other words, the NAC is the ultimate collective decision-making apparatus inside 
the Alliance and the forum where member nations are free to express their views 
on issues pertaining to their interest. 
However, examining the history of political consultation inside the Alliance, 
the “first committee appointed by NATO in 1951 to consider how the non-military 
activities of the Organization could be increased had, after protracted 
deliberations, come out of the same door it had entered.”74 During the early 
years, NAC meetings or bilateral deliberations were able to accommodate the 
requirements of policy formulating. After all, during its very early period, the 
Alliance had no military structure to support Allied strategy. More or less, the 
Alliance was using the normal channels of diplomacy which were considered 
adequate for dealing with “routine political issues.”75 
Even before the establishment of NATO’s military structure stemming from 
the fear caused by the events in Korea, the NAC in its first session sought to 
examine ways to setup the “machinery” of political consultation mostly motivated 
by Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty.76 Thus the NAC appointed a committee 
                                                 
72 North Atlantic Treaty Organization - Office of Information and Press, NATO Handbook, 
(Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 2001). 
73 Norman J. Padelford, "Political Cooperation in the North Atlantic Community," 
International Organization, 9 3 (1955): 353-365.  
74 Gardner Patterson, Edgar Stephenson Furniss, and Princeton University., NATO, A 
Critical Appraisal, (Princeton, N.J.: 1957), 69.  
75 Norman J. Padelford, "Political Cooperation in the North Atlantic Community," 
International Organization, 9 3 (1955): 355.  
76 Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty, as mentioned above, in short stipulates a call for 
the Allies to develop further peaceful and friendly relations in the direction of achieving political and 
economic goals. For further details see North Atlantic Treaty Organization - Office of Information and 
Press, NATO Handbook, (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 2001), 527.  
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under the Canadian Foreign Minister L. Pearson. “The Pearson Committee first 
reviewed the work…which was already being done by member governments in 
other international bodies. It soon found that quite a lot had been, and was being 
done.”77 In this connection, it is worth mentioning the proposal set forth by 
“Senator Guy M. Gillette of Iowa in 1951 [for] an annual meeting of legislators 
from the several NATO countries more or less along the lines of the Consultative 
Assembly of the Council of Europe…[along with] [r]epresentatives of Norway 
[who had] pressed for such a gathering.”78 This initiative of the Norwegian 
Parliamentarians and the U.S. Senator is recorded as the precursor of the NATO 
Parliamentary Assembly. 
 
2. The Committee of the Three 
The next major effort to formulate the norms of NATO’s political 
consultation was the committee of the “Three Wise Men” which filed its report for 
the consideration of the NAC in 1956. The works of this committee are 
considered a milestone for the Alliance since the three Foreign Ministers79 had to 
take into account “severe strains” in the intra-Allied relations, obviously 
emanating from the very recent the Suez crisis. The committee produced a very 
elaborate final text which dealt with not only the issues of political consultation, 
but also with out-of-area problems and methods to coordinate policies when such 
issues arise. It also reaffirmed and in a way still reminds the Allies that their 
cooperation stems from a far-reaching commitment as expressed in Article 5. 
The committee also underlined the issues of solidarity, and thus allied cohesion, 
those of economic and political cooperation, which in turn provide additional 
incentives for the Allies to develop a closer collective relationship. Moreover, the 
                                                 
77 Lord Ismay, The First Five Years 1952-1957 [Internet] (2001, accessed 10/11 2004); 
available from http://www.nato.int/archives/1st5years/chapters/14.htm.   
78 Ibid.; Norman J. Padelford, "Political Cooperation in the North Atlantic Community," 
International Organization, 9 3 (1955): 361.  
79 Halvard Lange of Norway, Gaetano Martino of Italy and Lester Pearson of Canada. 
 32
committee referred to the out-of-area issues80, since not only there are Allies with 
worldwide commitments and interests, but also events occurring outside the 
North Atlantic area exert great influence and have substantial repercussions on 
the collective interests of the Alliance. In addition “the wise men called for “NATO 
consultation whenever economic issues of special interest to the Alliance are 
involved, particularly those which have political or defense implications or affect 
the economic health of the Atlantic Community as a whole.”81 The committee 
also articulated the very close relationship that exists between foreign policy and 
defense from an Allied perspective: “There cannot be unity in defence and 
disunity in foreign policy.”82  
The crux of the committee’s findings can be summarized in its 
recommendations as follows: 
members should inform the Council of any development which 
significantly affects the Alliance. They should do this, not merely as 
formality but as a preliminary to effective political consultation 
both individual member governments and the Secretary General 
should have the right to raise for discussion in the Council any 
subject which is of common NATO interest and not of a purely 
domestic character; 
                                                 
80 On the out-of-area issues there are opinions that argue that “[i]n an observation of 
considerable foresight, the report also identified widening geographic concerns: “NATO should not 
forget that the influence and interests of its members are not confined to the are covered by the 
Treaty, and that common interests of the Atlantic Community can be seriously affected by 
developments outside the Treaty area.” Thomas J. Kennedy, NATO Politico-Military Consultation: 
Shaping Alliance Decisions, National security affairs monograph series ; 84-3 (Fort Lesley J. McNair, 
Washington, DC: National Defense University Press; Supt. of Docs., U.S. G.P.O. [distributor], 1984), 
10. While there is no doubt that the three Wise Men were particularly foresighted, on the other hand 
one can argue that their findings were greatly influenced by hindsight, since the reverberations of the 
Suez crisis earlier that year were still resonating. The crisis provided them a tangible argument what 
can happen when there is lack of political consultation. Moreover, there is an implicit remark on the 
Suez crisis on par. 4 of the report. For further details see North Atlantic Council, Text of the Report of 
the Committee of Three on Non-Military Cooperation in NATO. [Internet] (NATO, 6/4/2000 1956, 
accessed 10/10 2004); available from http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b561213a.htm. 
81 Frederic L. Kirgis, "NATO Consultations as a Component of National Decisionmaking," 
The American Journal of International Law, 73 3 (1979): 376.  
82 North Atlantic Council, Text of the Report of the Committee of Three on Non-Military 
Cooperation in NATO. [Internet] (NATO, 6/4/2000 1956, accessed 10/10 2004); available from 
http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b561213a.htm.   
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a member government should not, without adequate advance 
consultation, adopt firm policies or make major political 
pronouncements on matters which significantly affect the Alliance 
or any of its members, unless circumstances make such prior 
consultation obviously and demonstrably impossible; 
in developing their national policies, members should take into 
consideration the interest and views of other governments, 
particularly those most directly concerned, as expressed in NATO 
consultation, even where no community of views or consensus has 
been reached in the Council; 
where a consensus has been reached, it should be reflected in the 
formation of national policies. When for national reasons the 
consensus is not followed, the government concerned should offer 
an explanation to the Council.  It is even more important that where 
an agreed and formal recommendation has emerged from the 
Council's discussions, governments should give it full weight in any 
national actions or policies related to the subject of that 
recommendation.83 
The consultation process inside the Alliance continued to develop and was 
enhanced by the adoption of several levels in the pertinent “machinery.” The 
appointment of Secretary General during the Lisbon Council in 1952 and “the 
creation of the Division of Political Affairs”84 provided the Alliance with additional 
elements where member nations cooperate through the consultation process. 
The appointment of the Secretary General of the Council is of particular 
significance, since, while up to that point the Council was not headless85 the 
presiding Minister had a dual role to serve. The office of Secretary General was 
utilized to supersede this dualism being observed when the presiding delegate 
                                                 
83 North Atlantic Council, Text of the Report of the Committee of Three on Non-Military 
Cooperation in NATO. [Internet] (NATO, 6/4/2000 1956, accessed 10/10 2004); available from 
http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b561213a.htm.  
84 Political Affairs Division North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Historical-Officer, Monograph 
on "The evolution of NATO political consultation 1949 - 1962" [Internet] (NATO, 2004, accessed 2/28 
2004); available from http://www.nato.int/archives/docu/d630503.htm.  
85 The U.S. representative presided the NAC acting as both the presiding officer and 
national delegate. 
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had also to serve his simultaneous duties as a national representative.86 In other 
words, the institutionalization of the officer presiding the North Atlantic Council 
added one more level, not only to the deliberation process within the Alliance, but 
also to the external image of the Alliance, since NATO had acquired a more 
substantive form. The development of several standing or ad-hoc working groups 
contributed to the consolidation of common consultation procedures, in a 
productive top-down approach which allows the member nations to express their 
views in a variety of issues and finally reach an agreement forwarded to higher 
levels. 
In later years, the rhetoric about consultation as a means to promote allied 
cohesion remained vigorous. 
Increased consultation in NATO was praised by Dulles as providing 
the means to realize the more positive goals of the Atlantic 
Community.  Consultation would do more than prevent a repeat of 
Suez; it will help to demonstrate that the nations of this community 
are not solely concerned with matters of military defense to create a 
defense against Soviet aggression. We are also developing a 
political climate good for all people everywhere who want to see 
peace and justice and human welfare. 
The difference between pre- and post-Suez conceptions of an “Atlantic 
Community rests in the emphasis placed on consultation in the post-Suez 
period.”87  
 
3. The Harmel Report 
The next major milestone for the Alliance consultation process was the 
Harmel report of 1967. The report, named the “Future Tasks of the Alliance,”88 
                                                 
86 Political Affairs Division North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Historical-Officer,, Monograph 
on "The evolution of NATO political consultation 1949 - 1962" [Internet] (NATO, 2004, accessed 2/28 
2004); available from http://www.nato.int/archives/docu/d630503.htm.  
87 Ian Q. R. Thomas, The Promise of Alliance: NATO and the Political Imagination, 
(Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1997), 58.  
88 The Harmel Committee North Atlantic Treaty Organization, The Future Tasks of the 
Alliance ("The Harmel Report") [Internet] (NATO, 2004, accessed 10/12 2004); available from 
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reaffirmed the necessity and value of consultation for the Alliance, but also for the 
individual member states, which “[a]s sovereign states…are not obliged to 
subordinate their policies to collective decision. The Alliance affords an effective 
forum and clearing house for the exchange of information and views; thus, each 
of the Allies can decide its policy in the light of close knowledge of the problems 
and objectives of the others. To this end, the practice of frank and timely 
consultations needs to be deepened and improved. Each ally should play its full 
part in promoting an improvement in relations with the Soviet Union and the 
countries of Eastern Europe, bearing in mind that the pursuit of détente must not 
be allowed to split the Alliance. The chances of success will clearly be greatest if 
the Allies remain on parallel courses, especially in matters of close concern to 
them all.”89 Despite the fact that the main goal of the Harmel report was not 
directly connected with the “habit of consultation,” it stressed the importance of 
political cooperation among the Allies and the importance of strong Allied political 
institutions.90 
 
4. The Ottawa Declaration 
In 1973, the Middle East would again become the epicentre of the 
consultation process, or more precisely the lack thereof, inside the Alliance. Once 
more, historic events would occur in a territory outside the Alliance’s area, with 
the political conditions by and large uncontrollable by the majority of the Allies. 
Such politico-military events would show that common practice was not kept this 
time from the other side of the Atlantic. Moreover, the forthcoming crisis can be 
traced in the U.S. involvement in Indochina and its repercussions for the 
European Allies.  
                                                 
89 The Harmel Committee North Atlantic Treaty Organization, The Future Tasks of the 
Alliance ("The Harmel Report") [Internet] (NATO, 2004, accessed 10/12 2004); available from 
http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b671213a.htm.  
90 Stanley R. Sloan, NATO, the European Union, and the Atlantic community: The 
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Since 1969, when Nixon and Kissinger had adopted the Nixon Doctrine 
(“America’s new criteria for involvement abroad”91), the European Allies were 
suspicious about the real incentives behind it. This suspicion arose from the fact 
that U.S. policy was focused mainly in Indochina which absorbed most of the 
resources. “Between 1963 and 1970, one hundred thousand troops had been 
withdrawn from Europe.”92 During that period (the late 60s early 70s), the U.S. 
was well involved in the “Vietnam debacle” and was looking for ways to extricate 
itself. After the proclamation of the Nixon Doctrine, the gradual withdrawal from 
Southeast Asia, and the events on the economic sphere,93 in 1973 Kissinger 
(Nixon’s National Security Advisor) put forward his proposal “for a new ‘Atlantic 
Charter,’ a rededication of the Atlantic Alliance, followed in a major address on 
April 23, 1973…Laced with arrogance, the speech was drawn up without 
significant consultation either at home or abroad. Not even Secretary of State 
William Rodgers had advance notice of Kissinger’s terms.”94 
Such lack of consultation characterized Kissinger’s tenure in the U.S. 
administration. Moreover, it constitutes a case study on the influence of domestic 
politics on international events and the potential for worldwide ramifications. 
Furthermore, it shows that domestic politics, namely the Watergate scandal, that 
had kept the U.S. president preoccupied, “left Kissinger with more power than he 
had enjoyed in the first administration.”95  The Allied unity was severely breached 
with the events of the Yom Kippur war of 1973.  “…American anger was [beyond 
                                                 
91 Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), 707-708.  
92 Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall, Allies in Crisis: Meeting Global Challenges to Western 
Security, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), 137. 
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any doubt caused by] Europe’s distancing…from its major ally.”96 Despite the 
underlying “political and economic undertones,” Europe’s behaviour may well 
have been considered a parallel of the U.S.’s behaviour towards Britain and 
France. As “American coercion of its Allies, [during the Suez crisis], resulted from 
a mutual sense of betrayal of the community, leading to the violation of norms 
and the temporary breakdown of the collective identity,”97 the European Allies 
functioned in an analogous manner. The Europeans considered that the prime 
ally did not abide with established norms, and distanced itself from the “habit of 
consultation.” After all, issuing a DEFCON III alert98 with the Allies being 
informed about it form mass media99 would possibly endanger a nuclear 
confrontation.  
The following year, 1974, twenty five years after the conclusion of the 
Washington Treaty of 1949, in the aftermath of the October War in the Middle 
East, and the unilateralism exhibited by the U.S. the NAC issued the Declaration 
on the “Atlantic relations.” Its paragraph 11 reads as follows: 
The Allies are convinced that the fulfilment of their common aims 
requires the maintenance of close consultation, cooperation and 
mutual trust, thus fostering the conditions necessary for defence 
and favorable for detente, which are complementary. In the spirit of 
the friendship, equality and solidarity which characterize their 
relationships, they are firmly resolved to keep each other fully 
informed and to strengthen the practice of frank and timely 
consultations by all means which may be appropriate on matters 
relating to their common interests as members of the Alliance, 
bearing in mind that these interests can be affected by events in 
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other areas of the world. They wish also to ensure that their 
essential security relationship is supported by harmonious political 
and economic relations. In particular they will work to remove 
sources of conflict between their economic policies and to 
encourage economic cooperation with one another.100 
Once more, one can observe a recurring pattern for NATO, by which the 
Allies pledge to “keep each other fully informed [of actions and policies that have 
Alliance-wide effects].” Moreover, the declaration recognizes the fact, which 
bears historical accuracy in its own right, that Allied interests “can be affected by 
events in other areas of the world.”101 Also the wording of the declaration implies 
that consultation was neither timely nor frank, since the Allies “are firmly 
resolved” and expressed their determined will to “strengthen” the practise of 
consultation. 
In subsequent years, NATO’s consultation process was tested and 
retested through various developments in areas of strategy and policy, including 
the deployment of a new generation of ballistic missiles and the response to the 
Warsaw pact’s efforts for modernization. Moreover, the Alliance, based on the 
axioms of the Harmel report, pursued a “dual track” policy.102 One track was 
promoting the deployment of the aforementioned missiles, while the other called 
for arms control, since both sides were “long past the point of saturation.”103 
 
5. “Dual track” up to the 1980s 
During the decade from the late 1970s until late 1980s, the consultation 
process among the Allies was a common practice. In addition, several issues 
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were raised like, the “dual track” policy, the Soviet SS-20 missiles versus NATO’s 
Pershing II, the natural gas Euro-Soviet pipeline, and the Carter doctrine.  While 
there were several controversial reactions to certain policies, none became “out 
of control” and thus no spectacular event of the magnitude of those of the 
preceding decades occurred. In contrast, with the Carter doctrine –“[the] 
proclamation of American interests in Southwest Asia…”104 – a new era was 
formally introduced and was marked by official NATO collective concerns about 
out-of-area issues. The culmination of the “capable Allies” to operate out-of-area, 
came in a region that would challenge Allied policies in the following years, and 
that was the Persian Gulf during 1987-88.105 
In Europe, the main Cold War “battleground,” the 1980s were dominated 
by the unexpected changes that occurred in the Soviet Union with the rise in 
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power of Michael Gorbachev.106 Moreover, in the early 1980s the U.S., through 
President Reagan, changed its policies from “peaceful coexistence” to what 
might be called “peaceful confrontation.” The U.S. initiated an ambitious ballistic 
missile defense scheme under the title “Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI),”107 as 
well as, other advanced military initiatives. While the overall technology was not 
advanced enough to meet the stated operational requirements of SDI, it was 
certain that in the long run advances would come which the Soviets would be 
hard-pressed to match. At the same time, such developments increased the 
existing capability gap between the European Allies and the U.S.108 In any case, 
as already mentioned, no “spectacular” events occurred in the Alliance, in terms 
regarding the consultation machinery. However, NATO was trying to decipher the 
repercussions of the rhetoric of the new Soviet leader. Moreover, a climate of 
euphoria spurred within the Alliance109 since the two superpowers succeeded in 
agreeing and signing the “Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF)” Treaty which 
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“eliminated all land based missiles with ranges between 500 and 5500 
kilometres.”110 The INF Treaty was based on the strategy articulated in the 
Harmel report that “…called on NATO to pursue negotiations with the Soviets on 
the basis of military strength and political solidarity. The 1979 decision [leading to 
the deployment of cruise and Pershing missiles] had been the latest doctrinal 
manifestation of this formula, and the success of the INF negotiations now 
appeared to justify the heavy political price that the deployment decision had 
exacted in terms of public opposition throughout the early 1980s.”111  
 
C. THE 1956 SUEZ CRISIS 
 
1. Introduction 
The Suez crisis illustrates what the lack of consultation, especially in 
military alliances, can mean. Many scholars attribute the reasons for the crisis to 
an “amalgamate,” a fusion of personal misunderstandings and perceptions as 
well as of broader strategic considerations. Moreover, there are studies of the 
economic aspect of the crisis, or studies that conclude with explanations based 
on power politics.112 However, there is one unbiased, objective and unshakable 
historic event, well recorded and documented that led to the Suez crisis, and that 
is the lack of consultation among the U.S., United Kingdom and France. Besides 
the fact that the crisis is shown not to have affected the “close relationship” 
between the Britain and the U.S. it has underlined its post Second World War 
status. Moreover, the Suez crisis is not an isolated event.  It came as a corollary 
of other affairs and shaped the Middle and Near East for the years following. 
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2. Brief Historical Background 
The end of the Second World War brought widespread changes in the 
International System. One of the most prominent was the end of colonialism and 
the emergence of what became known as the Third World. A leading figure in 
these developments was Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser, “who had acquired 
dictatorial power in Egypt and “envisioned a vast Pan-Arab empire from the 
Atlantic to the Persian Gulf under his own leadership.”113 
One can argue that the events of 1951 in Iran114 provided the precursor to 
the Suez crisis and the forceful withdrawal of the British from that region.  On July 
26, 1956, Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal Company.115 That move initiated a 
series of events that would lead to Anglo-French collusion with the Israelis116 for 
a coordinated attack against Egypt. This attack aimed at restoring the formers’ 
control over the Suez Canal by military force, and providing Israel with Sinai as a 
security buffer zone. The French were “jointly [with the British] studying the 
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military problem involved in the reoccupation of the Canal Zone.”117  Moreover, 
they held Nasser responsible for providing assistance to the Algerian insurgency, 
and so in their opinion, “If Egypt's action remained without a response, it would 
be useless to pursue the struggle in Algeria.”118 
However, U.S. views were totally contradictory to the use of armed force. 
While Nasser’s move was viewed by the U.S. administration with the same 
criticism as the British and the French, the prevalent opinion in Washington was 
that as long as Egypt was not attacking “our people” and was not impeding free 
navigation through the canal, there was no justification for the use of force. 
Moreover, there is some evidence that despite the fact that “president 
[Eisenhower] remained staunchly opposed to military force…, [the Secretary of 
State Dulles], favored stronger action against [Egypt] if Nasser rejected 
reasonable proposals….”119 The French, in their part, had concluded “that it was 
‘better to act bilaterally [with the British] than do nothing trilaterally’….”120 In 
October 1956, the collusion was in full-scale and military operations were initiated 
by the British and the French without informing the primary ally. “The result was 
the near destruction of the Alliance as the United States sided with the Soviets to 
oppose the Suez operation. It was a painful moment for all the Allies because the 
abortive invasion of Egypt coincided with Soviet suppression of the Hungarian 
revolt against the Warsaw Pact. Instead of condemning the Soviets' brutal 
actions in Hungary, NATO found itself on the defensive as the Communist world 
condemned the Anglo-French aggression against Egypt in the United 
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Nations…Both Britain and France succumbed to this combined pressure and 
retreated from the canal.”121 
 
3. Analysis 
In the Suez case there is a clear divergence of perceptions about the 
interests of the Allies and how they are perceived by each individual actor.  The 
U.S. on one hand had been committed to apply containment against Communist 
spread in areas where the conditions of popular unrest, and economic 
dissatisfaction prevailed. Higher strategic goals dictated that the U.S. would have 
to consider other options excluding military intervention or at least keeping it as a 
very remote potential, to solve the Suez crisis. 
On the other hand the British sought to sustain pre Second World War 
colonial practices and Suez can be considered as such.  Mercantile policies in a 
transformed world-wide political landscape where the Atlantic Charter’s 
declaration implicitly accepted the emancipation of colonial dominions were 
synonymous with political upheaval and regeneration of nationalist sentiments. 
The French were also experiencing instability in Algeria, after having 
already suffered from what they regarded as abandonment by the “Anglo-
Saxons” during their earlier campaign in Indochina. Their incentive to deal with 
Nasser, as mentioned above, stemmed from their perception that the latter was 
“supporting and sustaining the Algerian rebellion.”122  However, Egypt did not 
provide significant material aid to the [Algerian “Front de Liberation Nationale”] 
FLN; but then, neither did anyone else. It did provide some, however, and it 
certainly provided political support, including a base from which FLN external 
operatives could appeal to the larger world. 
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The argument that the British were misled by Dulles sounds plausible but 
looses its effectiveness since the U.S. President had conveyed a clear message 
and had made his crystallized position on the issue well known to Eden. On his 
telegram to the British Prime Minister, dated September 8, 1956, he writes “… 
The use of military force against Egypt…might cause a serious misunderstanding 
between our two countries because I must say frankly that there is as yet no 
public opinion in this country which is prepared to accept [military action]…  
[R]esort to military action when the world (emphasis mine) believes that there are 
other means available for resolving the dispute would set in motion forces that 
could lead, in the years to come, to the most distressing results…”123 
Furthermore, one more dimension must be considered and it concerns 
U.S. attitude during the crisis. One can argue that this dimension is “enclosed” in 
Eisenhower’s wording when he invoked U.S. public opinion, which was inherently 
against any colonial movement. Franklin D. Roosevelt’s legacy was based on the 
premise that the post-Second World War European restructuring would be 
achieved “through disbarment and decolonization.”124 Moreover, “[e]conomic 
chaos, political frustration, and uncertainty were believed to be the sine qua non 
of Communist advance…With regard to empires The United States was sensitive 
on two interrelated issues: (1) avoidance of the creation of hostile, perhaps leftist 
oriented…developing nations; and (2) avoidance of close identification with the 
reactionary colonial policies of its European Allies especially those practices that 
corresponded with the purposes and goals widely attributed to the Soviets.”125 
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As to the political consultation issue inside the Alliance, there is evidence 
that the British wished NATO to be “consulted” on a broader basis.126 However, 
the U.S. opposed such strategy because it considered that there was danger in 
derailing other initiatives already underway, particularly “if it were to appear that 
NATO [was] directing Suez policy.”127 Thus, there is clear evidence that from a 
political standpoint Britain, France, and the United States failed from the start to 
follow a coherent common course of action.  This failure can be mainly attributed 
to the diverse incentives of the actors. The U.S. side was driven by anti-colonial 
sentiment manifested in opposing action against Nasser before exhausting all 
other political measures, and in particular those promoted by the U.S. Moreover, 
the U.S. failed to convey once more its messages when Dulles “pointedly did not 
attend, [and] all the other foreign ministers were present”128 at the NAC meeting 
of September 5, 1956. On the other hand, in a message from the Secretary 
himself to the U.S. Embassy in Paris, Dulles expresses his frustration about the 
fact that “…we [the U.S.] do not know where they [the British and the French] 
stand nor are we consulted (emphasis mine).”129 The British side was adamant 
to reassert its influence on the Middle East and considered military action as an 
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imperative from the beginning.130 The French inclinations were “to destroy the 
Egyptian leader because of this support for the Algerian rebels.”131 
In any case, the fact remains that the Anglo-French coalition was forced to 
withdraw from Egypt. The Atlantic Alliance reached a critical point due to the 
cleavage among the three most powerful Allies, and as a result, Allied cohesion 
was heavily damaged, and the consultation norm seemed crippled, if not dead. 
However, the cohesive power stemming from the common enemy, as well as the 
premises on which democracies are based, allowed NATO to readjust and its 
members to embed in their rationale that agreement through compromise and 
intense deliberations was the only way ahead. 
In her elaborate analysis, Sherwood-Randall attributes the failure of policy 
coordination to the “insurmountable differences” among the Allies stemming from 
their “divergent interests.”132 This is true as it pertains to the diversion of 
interests; however, there is one point missing which lies at the very essence of 
any alliance. Alliances are collective instruments and decisions are reached 
through deliberations with the final outcome serving the best interest of all the 
Allies. Indeed, differences can be insurmountable when the Allies are reluctant at 
different stages of the process to consult with the other members of the Alliance.  
In other words during the Suez Crisis, no one can really know what would have 
happened if the Allies operated from the beginning on a truly collective level on 
an issue whose ramifications were of concern to all members of NATO. While as 
she correctly points out that the communication between the U.S., the U.K., and 
France were well established and “no greater amount of consultation would 
necessarily have prevented the split within the Alliance,” the missing point is that 
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NATO was not only comprised by the U.S., U.K., and France. The core of the 
argument, which is implicitly confirmed at a later stage (in the NAC Final 
Communiqué of December 11-14, 1956), is that there was no true consultation 
among all the members of the Alliance. If there was true consultation among the 
Allied nations, no one can really predict what could or would have happened.  
Historical examination of the ministerial communiqué of NAC’s plenary meeting 
of December 11-14, 1956, in Paris, confirms this assertion. In paragraphs 2, 3 
and 4, the communiqué reads: 
In the meeting just ended, the Ministers drew from the experience 
of past divergence's in the policies of NATO members the 
confirmation of the necessity for all members to develop effective 
political consultation and co-operation.  They reaffirmed their 
determination to work together in unity and friendship to achieve the 
aims of the Alliance and to strengthen the Alliance in all its aspects 
as an indispensable agency for security and peace. 
As a major forward step in the development of NATO in the non-
military field, the Council approved the recommendations of the 
Committee of Three in their report to the Council.  In doing so, the 
Council approved wider and more intimate consultation among the 
member states on political matters.  The Council also approved 
arrangements to aid in the settlement of disputes among members 
and adopted measures for strengthening the organization of NATO 
internally and for further co-operation between members in certain 
economic and cultural fields.  The report has been released by the 
Committee of Three. 
The Council reviewed the international situation, discussing frankly 
the problems which confront the Atlantic Alliance.  In the course of 
this discussion Ministers, realizing that their views were in general 
agreement, decided that the detail should be worked out by 
continuous consultation in the Council in the months ahead (all 
emphasis mine).133 
Further analyzing the communiqué, one can argue that it conveys the 
following messages: 
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• There was an identified failure of the consultation process (“…drew 
from the experience of past divergence's in the policies…). 
• The Allied nations “…reaffirmed their determination…” since 
divergence of actions and contradicting individual interests 
disconfirmed the unity of the Alliance. 
• The Council confirmed that the only way to avoid such or similar 
incidents in the future and converge the interests of individual states in 
an aggregate manner is to adopt “…wider and more intimate 
consultation among the member states on political matters.” 
• Finally democracies have in general the tendency to agree and thus 
provide the initial grounds necessary to develop further their accords. 
However, to reach the final goal of consensus “…continuous 
consultation…” is necessary.  
Moreover, as stated above, this particular NAC meeting “approved the 
recommendations of the Committee of Three” wise men, which was providing the 
guidelines for further development of the political consultations of the Alliance. 
 
D. THE OCTOBER 1973 (YOM KIPPUR134) WAR, “DR. FALKEN”135 AND 
NATO 
 
1. Brief Historical Background 
In early October 1973, supported logistically by the Soviet Union, Egypt 
and Syria attacked Israel in a surprising strike. The Israelis counterattacked, but 
they were in desperate need of outside assistance since the Arab strike had 
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inflicted serious loses, particularly on air assets.136 The U.S. initiated a re-supply 
of arms to the Israelis, using at least at the outset of the crisis, The Soviets at the 
same time were reinforcing and provided support to the Arabs. However, in due 
course, only Portugal continued to facilitate the U.S. resupply effort, with all the 
other Allies refusing assistance.137 The result was a massive-scale operation 
undertaken by the U.S. military, circumventing Europe in order to transport 
supplies to Israel. In October 22, 1973, a United Nations (UN) Security Council 
resolution138 mandated a cease fire; but on the 24th the cease fire was broken 
and Moscow sent an urgent message to Washington calling for mutual ground 
deployment, and if Washington would not comply, Brezhnev stated that Moscow 
would unilaterally deploy Soviet forces on the ground. The message was 
received by Kissinger, though it was addressed from Brezhnev to President 
Nixon.139  “Within hours of receiving the Soviet message, Kissinger put the global 
forces of the United States on nuclear alert. Around the world that night, 
American units were ordered to DEFCON III, the highest stage of readiness in 
peacetime. Under such circumstances, troops are placed on standby and await 
further orders. The Sixth Fleet, which was already stationed in the Mediterranean 
Sea at DEFCON II, remained poised to attack.”140 The road to escalation was 
open and Kissinger states that “[w]e were determined to resist by force if 
necessary the introduction of Soviet troops into the Middle East regardless of the 
pretext under which they arrived.”141 Moreover, Kissinger who was appointed as 
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both Secretary of State and National Security Advisor convened the “Washington 
Special Action Group (WSAG)--a special [National Security Council] NSC sub-
committee responsible for handling crisis situations” which prepared a 
response142 “to Brezhnev’s letter that would go out under the president's name, 
but which Nixon did not see at the time.”143  That letter rejected Soviet demands 
for “troops on the ground” as “not appropriate” and called for the two parties to 
exert their influence to “ensure compliance” of the Egyptians and the Israelis with 
the Security Council mandates. The alert was cancelled and Brezhnev, referring 
for the first time to the U.S. DEFCON III, mentioned that he was surprised, but 
nonetheless, that he realized that it was used as a “means of pressure on the 
Soviet Union,” which he replied, would fail to “intimidate us.” 144 
 
2. Consultation (lack thereof) in NATO 
During this period, the Alliance was by and large kept in the dark. The 
Allies were sporadically briefed and the first disclosed145 deliberations show that 
the U.S. permanent representative, Donald Rumsfeld outlined the situation 
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looking to NATO “partners for understanding and support.”146 In the same part of 
his telegram to the State Department, Rumsfeld called for Alliance solidarity and 
stated that the U.S. would not take actions unilaterally “though it can,”147 also 
stating that the U.S. was re-supplying Israel. Furthermore he asserted that the 
actions constituted a test for the Alliance in the eyes of Soviets, East Europeans, 
Arabs, and others.”148 Moreover he “called upon NATO partners for coordination 
of policies” on the Middle East issue. 
From the second part of the telegram,149 one can infer that the Allies were 
leaning sympathetically towards the U.S. position, that there were no major 
objections raised, nor any other discussion pertinent to the détente policies 
followed by the Allies individually or collectively. Moreover, the “spirit” of the 
views exchanged exhibited solidarity and cohesion. Even the French 
representative, while awaiting further instructions, was conciliatory. However, the 
U.S. airlift had commenced, according to Kissinger, after Nixon’s endorsement150 
on October 9-10. Moreover, the next official document that relates to NATO is the 
Department of State dispatch151 to the U.S. permanent representative that 
instructed Rumsfeld to inform NATO about DEFCON III “…on a completely 
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confidential basis…”152 However, the Allies had learned about the nuclear alert 
from the newspapers, since the information had been leaked, just as the rest of 
the world had learned it.153 In any case, the Alliance once more realized the 
drawbacks of a lack of consultation and the negative consequences on Allied 
coordinated action. At Brussels, the NAC convened and Rumsfeld reported the 
course of the deliberations with two messages addressed to the U.S. Department 
of State.154 These two telegrams eloquently convey the frustration of the Allies 
towards the U.S. for the latter’s decision “to consult the friends after it has 
consulted with the enemies.”155 Rumsfeld responded during NAC’s lunch that the 
Allies had “abundant opportunities” to make their views known,156 a point which 
is plausible, since the airlift was known, as well as the general course of events.  
Moreover, he raised the issue that there should not be any complaints raised but 
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rather “specific suggestions for improving [the] Alliance’s consultation 
procedures”.157 However, he did not make clear whether such suggestions would 
be on a technical basis or a political one, since the political aspects of the 
consultation process inside the Alliance were addressed by the committee of the 
three foreign ministers in 1956 and on the margin by the “Harmel report”. 
Rumsfeld did not clarify whether the U.S. wished to create a new committee to 
readdress the issues of political consultation. Moreover, there is no indication that 
any other representative raised this issue to the U.S. delegate. The U.S. 
representative also remarked that the “U.S. moves seemed to have the desired 
effect on the Soviets and thought the Allies might have found some satisfaction in 
that. Rumsfeld went on saying on personal basis that he makes “no apologies for 
U.S. actions whatsoever.”158  However, the U.S. representative failed to address 
what would have been the course of events for the Alliance but also for each 
country individually, in the unfortunate case the events had not unfolded as they 
had and the U.S. moves had an undesired effect on the Soviets. In other words, 
what would have been the case if the Allies were confronted with a dire fait 
accompli? This issue, from what is known, was not raised by the other 
representatives. 
As mentioned above, Kissinger criticized his decision to elevate nuclear 
readiness; however, at another point, Kissinger advocated for such a decision 
since as he correctly pointed out, the crux of the objection from the Allied  
standpoint  had  not  so  much  to  do  with “…timing as to the absence of  
opportunity to affect [the U.S.] decision.”159 In addition to this point, he cynically 
adds that the situation was such that “…we could not have accepted a judgment 
different from our own.”160 
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In any case, the Alliance “rebounded” and during the NAC’s meeting of 
June 19, 1974, the Allies published the Declaration on Atlantic Relations,161 
known as the Ottawa Declaration. Bitter rhetoric receded and once more the 
Alliance reaffirmed that the consultation norm should be abided and “co-
operation and mutual trust” should be maintained. Additionally, the Allies 
expressed their firm resolve  
…to keep each other fully informed and to strengthen the practice 
of frank and timely consultations by all means which may be 
appropriate on matters relating to their common interests as 
members of the Alliance, bearing in mind that these interests can 
be affected by events in other areas of the world …162 
The essence of this declaration is that the Allies recognized once more, on 
a “lessons learned” basis, that timely consultation is the essence of the Alliance, 
even in the presence of a tangible enemy, and in particular, on issues raised 
outside the trans-Atlantic area. Moreover, the Allies implicitly recognized the 
impact of technology and the acceleration that it could induce on issues of Allied 
interest. Thus, they underlined that “all means which may be appropriate” must 
be employed to implement the consultation norm and avoid unnecessary 
“stalling” in such issues. 
The next major issue for the Alliance would come through an 
unprecedented event that was by and large unpredictable or considered 
unfeasible. The demise of the Soviet Union would induce new allied policies and 
would reorient the Alliance to adjust its strategies in a initial climate of ambiguity 
for the future since the precipitating events of 1989 caught the Alliance unaware. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
160 Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, (Boston: Little Brown, 1982), 713. It is interesting to 
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161 North Atlantic Council, Declaration on Atlantic Relations [Internet] (NATO, 10/23/2000 
1974, accessed 10/12 2004); available from http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c740618b.htm. 
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E. THE END OF COLD WAR AND ARTICLES 4, 5 AND 6 
Although the issues raised from the radical change of the strategic 
environment with the demise of the Soviet Union constitute a separate study in 
their own right, it would be an oversight not to examine how the Articles in 
question have evolved during the decade from 1991 to 2001. German Unification, 
NATO’s expansion eastwards to cover the security vacuum created by the 
disintegration of the Warsaw Pact, the political evolution of Europe, and the 
crises in the Balkans are only a few of the issues that have shaped the Allied 
agenda after the abrupt end of the Cold War. 
The Alliance, in its new Strategic Concept163 of 1991, addressed the 
issues of “…crises affecting the security of allied [member nations],”164 as well as 
the management of such predicaments. The pledge which is embodied in Article 
5 and provides the guarantees of collective defense was now enlarged to include 
threats with a greater likelihood of occurrence but of a different nature than those 
during the Cold War. During the Cold War the main threat was stemming from a 
Soviet attack. In the new era such likelihood became an almost inexistent 
possibility. The Alliance contemplated to counter regional crises which do not 
require full military mobilization as any article 5 operation Thus NATO adopted 
the concept of non-Article 5 operations. Moreover, the new Strategic Concept 
formulated the rationale for the departure of the former NATO organization, 
oriented towards deterrence and countering the threats of the Cold War. The 
Alliance initiated a process aiming to the adoption of forces with "enhanced 
flexibility and mobility and an assured capability for augmentation when 
necessary."165 Interpreted further, NATO was adjusting to the new strategic 
environment by dropping its nuclear forces and adopting reductions of its 
                                                 
163 North Atlantic Council, The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept [Internet] (NATO, 1991, 
accessed 9/28 2004); available from http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c911107a.htm#II. 
164 Ibid., par. 19. 
165 North Atlantic Council, The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept [Internet] (NATO, 1991, 
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conventional forces; however, the latter were to be restructured to handle 
contemporary threats of the “indivisible security”166 of the Alliance. 
Additionally, one can argue that there is a consistent pattern that most of 
the contemporary security issues are more or less out-of-area issues, in which 
the “consultation machinery” provides the necessary mechanisms for policy 
coordination. “The new challenges to Allied security arose almost entirely well 
beyond the borders of NATO countries.”167 For example, during the Gulf War of 
1991, the Alliance, through Article 4, made possible the involvement and use of 
Allied assets. “Twelve of the 16 NATO Allies provided forces to the coalition. The 
United States was able to draw on the military infrastructure NATO had created 
over the years. Britain and France dispatched troops to the Gulf while other Allies 
facilitated the transit of U.S. aircraft through their logistical support. In the course 
of the buildup and the subsequent rapid victory over Iraq, the kinds of 
transatlantic tensions that had been visible during much of the Cold War were in 
abeyance.”168 
Furthermore, “[t]he outbreaks of regional ethnic conflicts on NATO’s 
periphery…”169 and specifically the former Yugoslavia crises, while they did not 
“touch” the Alliance’s concrete pledges emanating from Article 5, [they were] 
“near” out-of-area issues that could potentially affect Allied nations.  “The action 
taken by NATO…, under U.S. leadership [in Bosnia], suggests that the Allies had 
finally concluded that their core interests, [pertinent to security], were threatened 
and that action was imperative….”170 However, there lies a subtle but noteworthy 
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difference between Article 5 and non-Article 5 operations. The procedure for the 
former and what it means for the Allies is well defined, as elaborated above. For 
non Article 5 operations however, there is no defined procedure except what may 
be derived from political consultation. “The response of the Alliance in such 
cases [non-Article 5 operations] must be determined by individual, independent 
national judgements, all of which must be at last permissive of the proposed 
action, if not actively supported.”171 In order to coordinate the necessary 
responses, the Allies apply the procedures of political consultation to reach such 
decisions.172 
Regional outbreaks of ethnic violence have brought the Alliance face to 
face with the starkly contrasting military capabilities of the Allies. While this has 
been a recurring theme since 1952,173 the Kosovo air campaign of 1999 
confirmed that, despite the fact that the Cold War had been over for almost a 
decade, most of the Allied nation’s military capabilities had not transformed to 
meet the new challenges. “The high-intensity air campaign against Serbia over 
the Kosovo crisis demonstrated how important collective defense instruments, 
such as high-tech air capabilities can be to non-Article 5 operations.”174 Many 
factors can be attributed to the causes of such delays, however, there is 
evidence that the Alliance and the individual member nations, through recent 
military restructuring, are adapting to the new challenges. 
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Finally, it is most important to underline the fact that the new Strategic 
Concept of 1999 explicitly stipulated, as the cornerstone of the Alliance, its 
collective defense and the reinforcement of the trans-Atlantic link.175 In this way, 
this detailed document reaffirms the core function of the Alliance upon which all 
military and political capabilities are built upon. 
 
F. CONCLUSION 
NATO is an exceptional Alliance in history. It has developed highly 
elaborate and specialized mechanisms to serve the interests of its members.  
During the early years of NATO and due to the unsettled conditions after the end 
of the Second World War, the Alliance identified the issues that would preoccupy 
the Allies in the future. This process of developing the mechanisms that would 
eventually be utilized to address future challenges was worked through 
repeatedly, culminating in the Report of the Three Wise Men, which has provided 
the basis on which the Alliance continues to function to this day 
Since its inception the Alliance has faced challenges that have proven 
most acute when three conditions are met: 
• a security issue arises outside of the well defined area of Article 6, 
• the Allies do not consult or consult on a restricted basis,  
• unilateral action is finally undertaken and presented in the Alliance as a 
fait accompli. 
The conditions above apply in both the Suez Crisis and the October War. 
Contrasting these two distinct cases one can conclude at the following: 
• The 1973 crisis occurred in the same region, which in NATO terms was 
an out-of-area issue. 
• The main protagonists of the crisis were relatively identical in both 
cases. 
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• Both superpowers were engaged in the crisis; however the intensity of 
their engagement varied in proportion to the interests they believed to 
be at stake. 
• In terms of the NATO consultation norm, the two crises reveal a subtle 
but noteworthy difference: in the Suez Crisis the process initially 
faltered and finally collapsed. During the Yom Kippur War, the 
consultation process, in an Alliance-wide context, was nonexistent from 
the beginning. Nonetheless the outcome remains the same: unilateral 
actions and non-consultation compliance led to a crisis among the 
Allies. After both incidents, the Alliance restated and reaffirmed its unity 
both in the intra-allied and foreign fields. 
During the 1980s NATO managed to win the Cold War in a rather abrupt 
and unexpected manner. 
The Western victory in the Cold War was in part the triumph of 
coalition diplomacy. In the end, persistence and negotiation among 
the Allies paid off. Compromise kept the Alliance together and the 
process of debate helped to legitimize it.176 
NATO realized early enough the new challenges created and articulated a 
novel strategy to counter them. Moreover, it developed concepts within the 
Alliance to cooperate with former adversaries. Additionally, NATO survived the 
end of the Cold War because it managed to be recognized as the “…most 
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IV. NATO'S EVOLUTION FROM 2000 TO 2004 IN THE 
CONTEXT OF ARTICLES 4, 5 AND 6 OF THE WASHINGTON 
TREATY OF 1949 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will provide an analysis of the Alliance and its evolution 
under the prism of the events of September 11, 2001, with particular attention 
to the application of Articles 4, 5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty. It will also 
examine the out-of-area issues, and how these issues may transform the role 
of NATO. From that perspective, the pretext of the contemporary Allied 
policies can be traced back to the 1999 Strategic Concept. This text can be 
seen as an endeavor to extend Allied security functions, since it contains an 
articulate form of the NATO’s new roles. Article 24 of the Strategic Concept 
reads: 
Any armed attack on the territory of the Allies, from whatever 
direction, would be covered by Articles 5 and 6 of the 
Washington Treaty. However, Alliance security must also take 
account of the global context. Alliance security interests can be 
affected by other risks of a wider nature, including acts of 
terrorism, sabotage and organised crime, and by the disruption 
of the flow of vital resources. The uncontrolled movement of 
large numbers of people, particularly as a consequence of 
armed conflicts, can also pose problems for security and stability 
affecting the Alliance. Arrangements exist within the Alliance for 
consultation among the Allies under Article 4 of the Washington 
Treaty and, where appropriate, co ordination of their efforts 
including their responses to risks of this kind.178 
This paragraph provides the guarantees that the Alliance is committed 
to the Washington Treaty of 1949 as its basic premise. In addition, the second 
line’s “[h]owever,” introduces the potential threats that Allied leadership has 
contemplated for the future. 
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One can argue that the 1999 Strategic Concept provided a double-
tiered defense policy179 for the Alliance and closer examination supports such 
an assertion: 
• Tier One is the reaffirmation of the guarantees provided by Article 5.  
The Alliance remains committed to the self defense pledges of the 
Washington Treaty through the elaborate mechanisms established 
in the Euro-Atlantic area. 
• Tier Two affirms the political will and the military capability of the 
Alliance to deal with broader threats affecting the stability of the 
Allies. 
The aforementioned paragraph of the Strategic Concept of 1999 
embraces all three Articles that this study seeks to examine. Consultation is 
considered the ultimate political tool for the Allies to reach consensus with 
respect to “risks of wider nature.” The main threat of the Cold War had 
subsided, despite the fact that residual threats of a much smaller scale 
remained in place.180 Moreover, while the Alliance was, in general, getting 
ready to counter the threats of the meta-post Cold War era, the terrorist 
attacks at the World Trade Center towers and the Pentagon on September 
11, 2001, set the stage for the entry into a new strategic landscape. 
 
B. 2001 AND BEYOND 
The whole planet watched, with abhorrence, the attacks on the twin 
towers in New York and the Pentagon. The attacks not only were to transform 
                                                 
179 At this point it must be noted that the double-tier notion has nothing to do with the dual-
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America but the Alliance as well. For the first time in its history, NATO invoked 
Article 5, and the Allies came together to defend the U.S.  As many scholars 
and policy makers have noted,181 Article 5 was articulated vaguely, as it was 
necessary to balance between the automaticity of the involvement of the 
Allies and the sovereign rights of the Allied nations to declare war.  Also, the 
Article was serving as an instrument of deterrence since it implied during the 
inception of the Treaty that the “…defenseless Western (sic) Europe [was to 
be protected by] the powerful United States …”182  As Osgood points out:  
The founders of the Treaty, wary of America's history of isolation 
and conscious of Europe's dependence upon American 
intervention in two world wars, believed that a truly entangling 
alliance, formally binding the United States within the mutual 
obligations of several states, was essential to make America's 
commitment to come to the defense of Europe convincing to the 
potential aggressor and to the potential victims of aggression as 
well. 
The attacks of September 11 triggered supportive reactions from the 
European Allies, and in their first responses the members of the Alliance 
expressed their solidarity to their transatlantic ally. The NAC statement from 
the deliberations of September 12, 2001, reads inter alia: 
The North Atlantic Council met tonight to express its solidarity 
with the United States of America at this moment of great 
tragedy and mourning…All Allies stand united in their 
determination to combat this scourge. At this critical moment, 
the United States can rely on its 18 Allies in North America and 
Europe for assistance and support. NATO solidarity remains the 
essence of our Alliance.  Our  message  to  the  people  of  the  
United States is that we are with you. Our message to those 
who perpetrated these unspeakable crimes is equally clear: you 
will not get away with it.183 
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The culmination of the consultations between the Allies came the same 
day when the Alliance formally invoked Article 5. Along with other relevant 
stipulations, the statement of the NAC read: 
…The Council agreed that if it is determined that this attack was 
directed from abroad against the United States, it shall be 
regarded as an action covered by Article 5 of the Washington 
Treaty, which states that an armed attack against one or more of 
the Allies in Europe or North America shall be considered an 
attack against them all…184 
What is of particular importance is that the Alliance support was 
contingent on hard evidence that the attack came from the outside. Once 
those responsible for the attacks were identified, action could be taken 
against them, even in the form of military operations. Additionally, when all 
evidence pointing to Al Quaeda, Osama Bin Laden’s notorious organization 
was confirmed, there would not be any issue raised to equate this 
international terrorist network and the fight against it as a fight against all 
Islam in general. 
Moreover, NATO sought to get Russian support and in the statement 
issued after the meeting of the permanent joint council between Russia and 
NATO, the former pledged to fight against terrorism along with the U.S. and 
the Alliance.185 This is perhaps a statement of equal importance to the politics 
involved after the attack since it not only commits Russia in a joint endeavour 
with the Alliance against terrorism, but also provides an excuse for the 
Russians to combat domestic terrorism.  In other words, it is a statement that,  
besides the rhetoric of expressed solidarity, served the interests of both 
parties. A parallel press statement was issued after a session of the NATO-
Ukraine commission.186 
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All empirical evidence shows that the deliberations of the Article 5 
invocation were conducted at the permanent representatives’ level.  
Considering the magnitude of the commitment and the policy ramifications, 
the decision was reached in a relatively short period of time. There was no 
necessity to call for a meeting at a higher level since the solidarity was self 
evident. However, while the Allies where more than willing to provide help to 
the U.S. “as deemed necessary,” but America was apparently not prepared to 
accept it.“ A French diplomat told JDW, "We would need to have some kind of 
request from the U.S. and so far we have no idea what they want to do and 
whether they want a joint response.” Furthermore, “...But the Allies stand 
ready to provide assistance. Each ally individually or in consultation will make 
its own assessment about what it can provide, but already everyone is 
committed to respond to such a request.”187 Public opinion in Europe was 
overwhelmingly sympathetic towards the U.S. For example, in France, “96% 
of French adults said they felt a sense of solidarity with Americans following 
the attacks, with nearly three-fourths (72%) describing their sentiment as one 
of "complete" solidarity.”188 
As mentioned, one day after the attacks, on September 12, 2001, the 
Alliance declared that it was ready to fulfil the pledge of collective defense.  
However, it took 14 days for the U.S. to respond to the Allied declaration and 
then the U.S. fell short in sharing evidence to prove that the attacks were 
directed from abroad. On September 26, 2001, the “Deputy U.S. Secretary of 
Defense Paul Wolfowitz, during an informal meeting of NATO defence 
ministers in Brussels, “…was not ready to provide…evidence, and offered few 
details of the investigations into the attacks or possible military responses… A 
NATO official stressed that while expectations were high before the meeting, 
which for security reasons was transferred to Brussels from Naples, it 
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probably was not the time to invoke Article 5.”189 As Philip H. Gordon points 
out: “Wolfowitz's presentation reflected a longstanding mindset in the 
Pentagon and much of the Republican Party that saw U.S. leadership as 
essential and European Allied support as politically useful but not particularly 
significant militarily. In this case, it was reinforced by what many Americans 
saw as a key “lesson” of Kosovo. Whereas many in Europe saw the Kosovo 
air campaign as excessively dominated by the United States and American 
generals, most Americans - particularly within the military - saw just the 
opposite: excessive European meddling, with French politicians and 
European lawyers interfering with efficient targeting and bombing runs, and 
compromising operational security.”190 In any case 
On October 4, after having been presented with credible proof 
from US officials that the attacks were indeed sponsored from 
abroad, NATO Allies agreed to the U.S. request.  The measures 
included:  
• enhanced intelligence sharing, both bilaterally and within 
NATO; 
• blanket overflight clearances for US and other NATO aircraft; 
• assistance to Allies and other states that might be subject to 
terrorist threats as a result of their cooperation with the 
United States; 
• measures to provide increased security for US facilities in 
Europe; 
• backfilling certain allied assets in the NATO area that might 
be required elsewhere for the campaign against terrorism; 
• access for the United States and other Allies to ports and 
airfields on NATO territory; 
• the deployment of standing NATO naval forces to the 
Eastern Mediterranean; and 
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• the deployment of NATO airborne early warning-and-control 
systems (AWACS) to US airspace so that American AWACS 
could be used abroad.191 
1. The Afghanistan Campaign 
For the European Allies and the NATO structure, one could have 
argued that “alea jacta est”; however, the U.S. was intending to base its 
policies and military strategies in utilizing selective resources, and not 
collective resources as provided by NATO. The U.S. administration’s strategic 
concept was based on “clear objectives …determin[ation] to achieve them, … 
[and] strong leadership…”192 but outside the commitments of formal Alliances. 
Formation of a “coalition of the willing” would be the preferred path for the 
U.S. leaders and policy makers since “…wars can benefit from [them], to be 
sure. But they should not be fought by committee.  The mission must 
determine the coalition, and the coalition must not determine the mission.  If it 
does, the mission will be dumbed down to the lowest common 
denominator.”193 One can argue that the U.S. administration was reluctant to 
bind in a collective effort through NATO. “Ironically, however, it was the 
American rejection of European military involvement in the Afghanistan 
campaign that annoyed Europeans at the same time that American leaders 
were pressing for the Allies’ help.”194 Although the fact that the American side 
had a plausible argument derived from the Kosovo operations, the mixed 
messages that the U.S. sent, further exacerbated the tensions of the 
transatlantic link. Despite the uneasiness caused by the rhetoric and the 
actions of the U.S., the Allies contributed a broad spectrum of assistance, 
ranging from facilities, materiel, overflight and landing rights, as well as, more  
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tangible force deployments and engagements during the Afghanistan 
campaign. Lord Robertson, former NATO Secretary General, further 
elaborates on this issue: 
But the United States is a part of the NATO alliance, and 
invoking Article 5 gave [to the U.S.] some useful options.  Once 
the decision was made to launch the Afghanistan campaign, a 
switch clicked and the United States had only to ask for things 
like the use of alliance airspace, ports, and harbors, or the 
deployment of NATO AWACS to the United States. These 
things may look small, but they were actually fundamental 
building blocks to the campaign. In my opinion, NATO's 
invocation of Article 5 also allowed the United States to build its 
antiterror coalition much faster because the full authority of the 
NATO alliance was behind the effort.195 
2. The Iraq Crisis 
At the Prague Summit in 2002, Allied leaders expressed “…their 
pledge [of] our full support for the implementation of UN Security Council 
Resolution 1441 and call on Iraq to comply fully and immediately with this and 
all relevant UN Security Council resolutions.”196 The U.S. however, purported 
to be convinced of Iraq’s connection with international terrorism, and was 
inclined to the use of force to topple the Baghdad regime directly.197 The 
European Allies, on the other hand, with France and Germany in the front line, 
were opposed to such actions on the grounds that more time was necessary 
for the UN inspectors and to further strengthen the UN weapons inspection 
regime. However, “[in] mid-February the debate spilled over from the United 
Nations into NATO. 
The Bush administration sought to convince Turkey to allow U.S. 
troops access to Turkish military bases, from which a possible attack on 
northern Iraq could be launched. Thus, it proposed that NATO agree to 
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transfer Patriot missile systems, AWACs reconnaissance planes, and other 
assets to defend Turkey in the event of a possible attack from Iraq. Once 
again, France and Germany (supported by Belgium) blocked the proposed 
action, on the grounds that it prejudged the inevitability of war with Iraq.  
Under pressure from the U.S. and other NATO Allies, and after days of bitter 
negotiations, Germany and Belgium eventually agreed to the proposed 
measures, which were adopted within the NATO Defence Planning Council, of 
which France is not a member.”198 Notwithstanding the fact that the war in 
Iraq was swift and fast, it underlined the rift in transatlantic relations and the 
different approaches adopted by the Allies.  Once more, an out-of-area issue, 
unilateral action, and lack of adequate consultation (albeit inferred by 
presumptive evidence) had led the Alliance to a crisis. 
 
C. MILITARY ADAPTATION 
The events of September 11 bore out the fears voiced in the Strategic 
Concept of 1999. The attacks confirmed, in the worst possible way, the 
perceptions of planners and policy makers with respect to future risks.  
However, the next logical question to be considered concerns the level of 
Allied preparedness to counter such threats. NATO had initiated its 
restructuring from the static defense scheme dictated by the Cold War to the 
novel arrangements necessary for the new era. The Washington Summit of 
1999 could not afford to introduce the new Strategic Concept for the Alliance 
without providing the necessary strategy to achieve policy goals. The Allied 
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nations concurred in a procedure coined as the Defense Capabilities Initiative 
(DCI),199 which set forth new restructuring of the Allied military. In sum, the 
DCI made provisions for the non-Article 5 operations and the demands they 
dictate, including also other “[f]uture Alliance military operations…”200  
Moreover, the DCI text calls the Allies to develop further their interoperability, 
as well as, their capacity for “rapid deployment of significant forces outside 
national territory, or for extended sustainment of operations and protection of 
forces far from home bases.”201 Such operations “far from home bases” 
obviously can be considered not only operations like those conducted by the 
Alliance in the “near-abroad” air space of  Yugoslavia and Kosovo, but also 
much further from the limits of the Euro-Atlantic area. This is implicitly stated 
in the DCI communiqué since the latter puts strong emphasis on the “… 
deployability and mobility of Alliance forces, on their sustainability and 
logistics, their survivability and effective engagement capability, and on 
command and control and information systems.”202 Furthermore, during the 
NATO defense ministers’ follow-on meeting held in Ottawa in 1999, except for 
stressing the importance of “a strong transatlantic link,”203 the Allies 
emphasized their willingness to restructure the Alliance for the “common 
good.”204 
The deficiencies and delays of the DCI, as well as the deepening 
gap,205 created the necessity of formulating another strategy for addressing 
the issues that rose tangibly during the first Gulf War and the Kosovo air 
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campaign.206 The answer came during the Prague Summit, where the Allies 
at the end of the day, decided to proceed forward in three interconnected 
measures: 
• Streamline the Allied command structure to become more resilient 
and to accommodate the ramifications of the next wave of 
expansion;207 
• Establish the NATO Response Force (NRF);208 
• Adopt a roadmap of modernization and force reorganization, 
namely the Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC). 
Since then NATO Allies have focused on the reorganization of the 
command structure and the adoption of more robust and technologically 
advanced systems. Moreover, the Alliance took measures and is 
implementing strategies for advancing interoperability and deployability of 
Allied assets, aiming to close the capabilities gap and counter the palpable 
and emerging threats, asymmetrical conventional and strategic. 
 
D. ANALYSIS 
Terrorism, the main threat that spurred the debate over asymmetric 
dangers and risks, was introduced for the first time in NATO’s rhetoric in 
1981. The first report on a Ministerial level pertinent to terrorist acts and the 
abhorrence that such actions produce to the Alliance appears in the NATO’s 
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rhetoric with the “Declaration on Terrorism” of December 10, 1981.209  
Furthermore, the NAC meeting of 1982 at a “Heads of State and Government” 
level issued a NAC communiqué (The Bonn Declaration) which in paragraph 
7 focusing on “international terrorism” reads: 
We condemn all acts of international terrorism. They constitute 
flagrant violations of human dignity and rights and are a threat to 
the conduct of normal international relations. In accordance with 
our national legislation, we stress the need for the most effective 
cooperation possible to prevent and suppress this scourge. 210 
In the 1980s, the Alliance identified the “scourge” of terrorism which 
was addressed chiefly with domestic policies. Judicial institutions and 
domestic civil authorities were those responsible and constitutionally 
appointed to fight against terrorism. This was the Allied policy on terrorism at 
the time. 
The September 11, 2001, attacks provided new grounds to clear the 
uncertainties of Allied policies, as to the extent of Allied action, the form that 
such action should take, and the exploitation of the mechanisms in place to 
reach the desired consensus. It is evident that the Alliance is changing, and it 
is transforming its roles to counter threats in the global context. In other 
words, it goes out-of-area. The “potential risks” that the Alliance contemplated 
in the 1999 Strategic Concept are all stemming from the outside, from out-of-
                                                 
209 North Atlantic Council, Declaration On Terrorism [Internet] (NATO, 1981, accessed 10/16 
2004); available from http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c811210b.htm. This declaration is the 
first published online document in which NATO officially deals with terrorism. During 1981, a series 
of terrorist acts occurred spawned by the anti NATO and anti American feeling in W. Germany 
stemming from the protests of extreme leftist terrorist groups with the most prominent being the 
Baander Mainhof. These groups “opposed the stationing medium-range missiles in Western 
Europe and the U.S. decision to build neutron weapons.” The culmination of these acts was the 
terrorist attack at the U.S. Air Force Base at Ramstein, in August 31, 1981, claimed by the Baander 
Mainhof  a.k.a. the Red Army faction. See also U.S.  Department  of  State  -  International 
Information Programs, Significant Terrorist Incidents, 1961-2001: A Chronology [Internet] (U.S. 
Department of State, 10/15/2004 2001, accessed 9/28 2004); available from 
http://usinfo.state.gov/is/international_security/terrorism/terror_chronology.html. For further 
information concerning the attacks at the former W. Germany see: United Press International, 
Ramstein Air Base Terrorist Bomb, PM cycle [Internet] (United Press International, 1981,  
accessed 10/24 2004); available from www.lexis-
nexis.com/universe/document?_m=0e126bf5c1d4e941afb36cbe7d4ba3db&_docnum=15&wchp=d
GLbVlz-zSkVA&_md5=6a7e11458b162f0cadc0ce1eacfca7e5 and Bradley Graham, "Attacks 
Continue in Germany," The Washington Post, 9/2/1981 1981. 
210 North Atlantic Council, Declaration of the Heads of State and Government (The Bonn 
Declaration) [Internet] (NATO, 1982, accessed 10/16 2004); available from 
http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c820610a.htm. 
 73
area, and their repercussions are evident on the internal stability of the Allied 
nations. NATO has contributed heavily in restoring and preserving the 
strategic balance in Europe.  That balance has acquired new impetus through 
the NATO expansion and the promotion of the NATO-Russian relationship. 
Allied nations and the Alliance in general are greatly affected by 
strategies and actions stemming outside of the Euro-Atlantic region and, as 
experience has shown, when non-actors are involved, they pose a greater 
danger, since they constitute intangible threats. NATO has been severely 
affected by the attacks of September 11. But the analysis would be 
inconclusive if it failed to provide an answer as to what actions (or lack 
thereof) the Alliance had undertaken to preserve the unity and the cohesion of 
the institution. In this manner, it is logical to examine the course of events and 
estimate their weight in the transatlantic process. The Washington Treaty and 
Article 5, in particular, articulate clear commitments for each and every one of 
the Allies. It also provides great margins as to how each one of the Allies will 
contribute to the collective defense in case of an attack. Moreover, it does not 
provide a quantitative measurement of the contributing actions of the 
individual Allies. Thus every action is presupposed to be of equal weight. This 
was perhaps the rationale that was at the back of the mind of Lord Robertson 
when he made the statement that Article 5 invocation actually provided the 
U.S. with a “switch.” It is clear that the Alliance in the case of the September 
11 incident reached consensus in a short period of time and with no second 
thoughts. The invocation of Article 5, due to an attack against the most 
powerful ally, may appear to have had a mainly symbolic meaning, but this 
underestimates the importance of the action. What really undervalues its 
significance is how the primus inter pares decided to utilize the offering and 
the subsequent rhetoric involved. When the U.S. decided to engage in 
operations in Afghanistan, the Allies offered their assistance, but at some 
point even those with substantial assets in the theater were considered of 
secondary importance. As Lawrence Kaplan points out 
American misgivings about European interference in the 
conduct of the war were misplaced. Although their contributions 
were too modest to permit the North Atlantic Council the 
 74
authority it was able to exercise in the Kosovo campaign, the 
Allies filled gaps in equipment and personnel that Americans 
appreciated. The support they [the Allies] extended to the United 
States in the wake of the first American missile attacks against 
the Taliban on 4 November [2001] was consistent with the 
earlier dispatch of NATO AWACS to patrol the Atlantic coast.211 
Moreover, the invocation of Article 5 served to bolster the exchange of 
information and intelligence, an aspect of the multifaceted consultation 
process; NATO after the attacks set forth as a top priority the “…enhanced 
sharing of information among the Allies on threat warnings and intelligence 
…”212 One can plausibly argue that the U.S. could have undertaken the 
Afghanistan campaign aggregating in their power the contributions of the 
Allies without the latter posing any inhibition to the conduct of operations. 
However, allied assets: 
…did provide a variety direct and indirect support in both the 
campaign in Afghanistan and in the larger counter terrorism 
effort. 
The deployment of Alliance resources, including AWACS aircraft 
in the United States, special forces units in Afghanistan and the 
naval deployments to the Mediterranean and Arabian Sea, did 
significantly bolster the ability of the Bush Administration to 
conduct Operation Enduring Freedom. NATO actions both 
increased the capability of the coalition and freed up American 
resources for use in Afghanistan. NATO's military support and 
combat actions were facilitated by the high degree of 
interoperability within the Alliance. This allowed for both close 
cooperation during the combat operations in Afghanistan and in 
the naval mission in the Arabian Sea.213 
…The deployment of Alliance resources, including AWACS 
aircraft in the United States, special forces units in Afghanistan 
and the naval deployments to the Mediterranean and Arabian 
Sea, did significantly bolster the ability of the Bush 
Administration to conduct Operation Enduring Freedom.  NATO 
actions both increased the capability of the coalition and freed 
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up American resources for use in Afghanistan. NATO's military 
support and combat actions were facilitated by the high degree 
of interoperability within the Alliance. This allowed for both close 
cooperation during the combat operations in Afghanistan and in 
the naval mission in the Arabian Sea.214 
In addition, NATO by November 2002 was “poised to start playing its 
first official role in Afghanistan after Germany and the Netherlands asked the 
US-led military alliance to provide assistance when they jointly take over the 
lead of the international forces in Kabul early next year [2003].”215   
Since the deployment of the UN-mandated International Security 
Assistance Force (ISAF) to Afghanistan in January 2002, it has 
been under the command of NATO members, first the United 
Kingdom followed by Turkey.  During the next period, when it 
was under the command of Germany and the Netherlands, 
NATO Allies provided 95% of the personnel in ISAF III. On 11 
August 2003, NATO took over command of ISAF and is since 
then responsible for its coordination and planning. This is 
NATO's first operation outside the Euro-Atlantic area.216 
The case for Iraq however, stands in stark contrast to that of 
Afghanistan operations. This is not only due to the disputes that have risen 
pertinent to the legitimacy of the invasion, but also on the ways the issue was 
politically handled. Notwithstanding the fact that there is not enough 
conclusive and concrete evidence but only presumptive evidence, one can 
safely assume that there was lack of consultation inside the Alliance on the 
issue of Iraq. Instead of consultation, there was abundant information on the 
part of the U.S. Indirect but indicative evidence can be cited by accounting the 
consultation and the way this is conducted by the Secretary of State. As Ivo 
Daalder points out: “…Powell spends considerable time on the telephone with 
his European counterparts. But the quick phone call is more useful for 
delivering a demarche than gaining a true understanding of what it might take 
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to arrive at a common position.”217 This issue (the lack of consultation by 
personal contact) has also been brought up at the hearings of Committee of 
the U.S. House, and the testimony given by Assistant Secretary of State 
Jones in confirming that “Secretary Powell is on the phone”218 with his 
“European colleagues.” Moreover she also confirms 
But I can’t sit here and tell you [the members of the 
Subcommittee on Europe] that we [Americans] are always going 
to shift to do whatever anybody else wants us to do.  That isn’t 
going to happen. But we do listen, and we try to take into 
consideration.219 
The above extract exhibits two fundamental premises: a) the 
perceptions of the U.S. administration that someone, in this case the 
Europeans, is trying to shift its policies; b) the determination that this [shift] will 
not always happen. Pertinent to NATO, it should be noted that the 
“consultation norm [which is implicitly referred to by the statement of the 
Assistant Secretary] is codified and institutionalized in various NATO 
arrangements. Specific obligations prescribe consultation procedures in 
particular circumstances and related to specific issues.”220 In other words, 
when a member nation in NATO decides to consult it must be determined to 
present its arguments and “where common interests of the Atlantic 
Community are at stake, consultation should always seek to arrive at timely 
agreement on common lines of policy and action.”221 If an ally does not wish 
to consult and merely informs the Alliance of its decisions, this does not entail 
an automatic consensus. Elaborate deliberations among the member states of 
an Alliance always involve the likelihood of a necessary “shift” in order to 
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reach consensus. If consensus on a particular issue is not important for a 
member state, but its unilateral actions have an impact on the other members, 
this most certainly will lead to a crisis, as the experiences of Suez and the 
1973 War illustrate. In such a case it is reasonable for the Allies to proceed to 
subsequent motions expressing that the “…general feeling [is] that 
Washington does not consult with the European Allies in the relationship of 
the war on terrorism …”222 
In the case of Iraq, it has been strongly argued that the September 
11th incident gave the pretext for the U.S. administration to focus on it shortly 
after major operations in Afghanistan came to an end, a fact that was known 
in NATO.223 Moreover, as further evidence for the lack of consultation among 
the Allies and the U.S. becomes clear, one can argue that there is no 
indication of prior planning in NATO pertinent to the Iraq issue. This is 
advocated by at least two facts: first, Secretary Powell sent a letter in 
November 2002 to some 50 countries asking them for contributions to the 
then imminent war in Iraq.224 Second, “[o]n January 15, 2003, the United 
States formally requested that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
begin planning to defend one of its members, Turkey, from any counterstrikes 
launched by Iraq in the event of a war with Iraq. France, Germany, and 
Belgium, concerned that such a move by NATO would send a message that 
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war with Iraq was inevitable, resisted the request.”225 Despite the fact that 
eventually the protective measures for Turkey were taken, the U.S. initiative 
clearly adds up to the other relevant evidence that for the U.S. the war was 
inevitable, and that the Allies, since most of them were reluctant to endorse it, 
were merely informed. However, as already stated above, consultation is not 
the process of information; once more the three Wise Men offer their expert 
recommendation: 
[T]he essential thing is that on all occasions and in all 
circumstances, member governments, before acting or even 
before pronouncing, should keep the interests and the 
requirements of the Alliance in mind…A member government 
should not without adequate advance consultation, adopt firm 
policies or make major political pronouncements on, matters 
which significantly affect the Alliance or any of its members, 
unless circumstances make such prior consultation obviously 
and demonstrably impossible.226 
Due to the fundamental differences between the U.S. and most of the 
NATO Allies on the issue of Iraq’s invasion and occupation it is unlikely that 
the rift of opinion could have been bridged with patient and persistent 
diplomacy. The U.S. administration was heavily preoccupied with the issue 
and there were no margins for effective consultation with the Allies. The issue 
of Iraq presented a challenge for the Alliance, which was severely divided 
over it. One of the aspects of the crisis was “the obvious impossibility of 
assembly [of] a global coalition like that of 1991;”227 the U.S. side was aware 
of this reality and thus opted for an ad-hoc, more flexible coalition, since the 
rest of the world and the majority of NATO Allies, in particular, had a 
fundamentally different picture of the conditions in Iraq. The U.S. 
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administration was firmly determined “and was not going to be talked out of it, 
[over Iraq] even by more skilful and patient diplomacy.”228 
 
E. CONCLUSION 
NATO has a long history of adaptations, internal readjustments and 
transformations. Two of the former were conducted in a relatively short period 
accounting for the size and the politico-military implications and 
considerations of the Alliance. The cohesive bond provided by the primordial 
enemy that the Warsaw Pact presented came into being in a more assertive 
manner after the brutal attacks of the 11 September, 2001. NATO was there 
and declared its solidarity and willingness to apply common policies and 
strategies aimed at the elimination of the new enemy. However, different 
policies and approaches, as well as dissimilar opinions stemming from 
divergent interests and personal perceptions created a rift among the partners 
of the Alliance. Assertive rhetoric came from both sides of the Atlantic to 
exacerbate the cleavage. Moreover, as this chapter has shown, the pattern of 
out-of-area issues with lack of adequate consultation, in conjunction with 
predetermined actions is the basic foundation for the observed crisis. The 
Europeans were supportive during the Afghanistan campaign, not only 
because they felt obliged to respond, but also because their security was 
endangered too by international terror, and it was in their national interest to 
eliminate the threat. 
For an outside observer, the invocation of Article 5 was to provide the 
Alliance with more cohesion and assertion of actions. Nonetheless, unilateral 
actions based on erroneous or at least incomplete intelligence created a 
more-or-less “undesirable” situation for both the European partners and the 
U.S. The consultation machinery however, is still in place and provides all the 
necessary means to overcome the rift created; the only prerequisite is to use 
it and let others, in good will, express their concerns, which should be taken  
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under consideration. Moreover, the U.S., as the only superpower, conscious 
of its preponderance and superiority should consider what Dean Rusk used to 
say apropos, that the U.S. is: 
…the ‘fat boy in the canoe.’ When we shift our weight it makes a 
disproportionate difference. The fat boy has been shifting his 
weight a lot lately, often without much notice to the other 
passengers. And the boat we share with our European Allies is 
taking on dangerous amounts of water.229 
                                                 
229 Harlan Cleveland, Harlan Cleveland Commenting from Washington [Interenet] (2003, 
accessed 10/24 2004); available from http://www.worldpaper.com/2003/march03/iraq7.html. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
NATO is the most firmly structured and fully institutionalized Alliance of 
contemporary times. While only a portion of the national forces of each ally is 
disposed to NATO, the aggregate power of the allied nations is 
unprecedented in world history.  
NATO's utility has been questioned since the demise of the Soviet 
Union and the end of the Cold War. Nonetheless, one can argue that NATO is 
more than an ordinary military Alliance. During the Cold War it served to foster 
the necessary cohesion among the European states and eliminate the 
fundamental causes that had devastated the continent, keeping the U.S. 
involved. However, during contemporary times, stability in the Euro-Atlantic 
area is more or less secured. Despite the fact that there are frictions and a 
subtle potential danger of “local eruptions,” European security and defense 
can be considered to be consolidated and NATO is one of the cornerstones of 
this premise. Moreover, NATO serves as bridge for the transatlantic link, since 
notwithstanding the fact that U.S. and European cultures differ, “security is 
indivisible” and there is more than enough room for understanding between 
the two pillars of the Alliance. 
The North Atlantic Treaty and its stipulations remain current as they 
were when in 1949. The three articles examined in this study are explicitly 
referred in NATO’s strategic concept of 1999: 
Any armed attack on the territory of the Allies, from whatever 
direction, would be covered by Articles 5 and 6 of the 
Washington Treaty. However, Alliance security must also take 
account of the global context. Alliance security interests can be 
affected by other risks of a wider nature, including acts of 
terrorism, sabotage and organized crime, and by the disruption 
of the flow of vital resources. The uncontrolled movement of 
large numbers of people, particularly as a consequence of 
armed conflicts, can also pose problems for security and stability 
affecting the Alliance. Arrangements exist within the Alliance for 
consultation among the Allies under Article 4 of the Washington 
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Treaty and, where appropriate, co-ordination of their efforts 
including their responses to risks of this kind.230 
Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty is and will remain the crux of the 
Alliance. The meaning of this Article was originally defined by the persistent 
hostility of the Soviet Union in the Euro-Atlantic region. Out-of-area issues 
during the Cold War era were, by and large, exceptions to the rules. They 
were caused by unilateral policies of the Allies, or instigated by policies of the 
Soviet Union outside Europe, to which one or more Allies responded.  
Considering the consolidation of stability in the Euro-Atlantic area, future 
challenges will most likely come from abroad.  
The consultation clause of the North Atlantic Treaty is restated in the 
above extract as a fundamental process inside the Alliance, leading to better 
understanding among the member nations and thus more effective action. 
Hence the politico-military consultation and cooperation entailed in Article 4 
acquires greater importance. At times the obligation to consult and be 
consulted becomes implicitly imperative. In other words, where in the past 
Article 5 was “standing out” in itself, today and for the future its importance is 
considered de facto; emphasis is to be placed on the politico-military 
consultation among the Allies. 
In this view the Europeans should develop policies to close the 
capabilities gap. One source of cohesion in an Alliance stems from the ability 
of the Allies to interoperate, not only rhetorically, but also on more tangible 
terms like military capabilities. Moreover, the U.S. on the other hand, should 
take under consideration the different political culture of the European nations 
and reconfirm its ability to confer with its Allies and reach common political 
decisions. Hesitations based on public opinion anxieties and political cost 
calculations can sometimes inflict greater damage than military operations 
                                                 
230 North Atlantic Council, The Alliance’s Strategic Concept [Internet] (NAC, 4/23/1999 1999, 
accessed 9/28 2004); available from http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm. 
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themselves. As Eleftherios Venizelos has noted, “…when public opinion [is] 
not favorable, I tend to educate it and not to be influenced by it.”231 
NATO has to be a part of the history of the future and thus the Allies 
should recollect that the past offers valuable teachings for the future. As 
NATO’s first Secretary General, Lord Ismay pointed out vividly fifty years ago:  
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is entering upon a new 
phase which should demonstrate once again its adaptability to 
change and its capacity for progress.  
…Our community of free nations, with interests to many parts of 
the world is bound to be constantly faced with new problems 
requiring new solutions. Indeed, we in NATO will need for years to 
come, a great deal of imagination and energy in order to develop 
by collective action the defensive power of our Alliance and to 
tighten in all fields the bonds between member states on both 








                                                 
 231 Studies of Venizelos and his era, ed. Dimitrakopoulos, Odysseas, vol. 1 (Athens Greece: 
Philippotis, 1980), as quoted in Anastasiadou, “Venizelos and the Greek-Turkish Friendship 
Treaty of 1930,”, 384. Translation by the author. 
232 Lord Ismay, The First Five Years 1952-1957 [Internet] (2001, accessed 10/11 2004); 
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